Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.85x | 0.76x | 0.70x | 0.58x | 1.26x |
| Interest burden | 0.89x | 0.90x | 0.48x | 0.44x | 0.34x |
| Operating margin | 10.7% | 12.6% | 6.3% | 5.5% | 7.6% |
| Asset turnover | 0.78x | 0.80x | 0.79x | 0.80x | 0.56x |
| Leverage (equity mult.)driver | 2.05x | 2.00x | 3.09x | 3.47x | 5.15x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 13.0% | 13.7% | 5.2% | 3.9% | 9.4% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 12.4% | 13.0% | 6.2% | 4.2% | 6.2% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.38x | 1.16x | 1.16x | 1.56x | 1.27x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 1.33x | 1.08x | 1.09x | 1.48x | 1.23x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.53x | 0.28x | 0.27x | 0.50x | 0.16x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 64 M | $ 36 M | $ 44 M | $ 128 M | $ 120 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.52x | 0.39x | 1.06x | 1.59x | 2.76x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.05x | 1.00x | 2.09x | 2.47x | 4.15x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.26x | 0.19x | 0.34x | 0.46x | 0.54x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 47 M | $ 54 M | $ 178 M | $ 283 M | $ 778 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 8.87x | 9.66x | 1.92x | 1.78x | 1.52x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.05x | 2.00x | 3.09x | 3.47x | 5.15x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 17.9% | 19.9% | 14.4% | 13.0% | 12.6% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 10.7% | 12.6% | 6.3% | 5.5% | 7.6% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 8.1% | 8.6% | 2.1% | 1.4% | 3.2% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 98 M | $ 113 M | $ 94 M | $ 90 M | $ 154 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 23.7% | 23.8% | 16.4% | 13.0% | 17.4% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 6.3% | 6.9% | 1.7% | 1.1% | 1.8% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 13.0% | 13.8% | 5.2% | 3.9% | 11.0% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.85x | 0.76x | 0.70x | 0.58x | 1.26x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.89x | 0.90x | 0.48x | 0.44x | 0.34x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 12.4% | 13.0% | 6.2% | 4.2% | 6.2% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.78x | 0.80x | 0.79x | 0.80x | 0.56x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 37.60x | 20.61x | 25.75x | 31.10x | 37.26x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 4.54x | 4.01x | 3.71x | 4.02x | 2.69x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 5.03x | 3.22x | 3.53x | 5.01x | 2.73x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 9.7 days | 17.7 days | 14.2 days | 11.7 days | 9.8 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 80.4 days | 91.0 days | 98.3 days | 90.8 days | 135.7 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 72.5 days | 113.4 days | 103.3 days | 72.8 days | 133.7 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 17.6 days | -4.7 days | 9.2 days | 29.7 days | 11.7 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 68 M | $ 35 M | $ 46 M | -$ 94 M | -$ 382 M |
Price Rp 4,709 · market cap Rp 48 T ($ 2.6 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | PTRO | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 91.33x | 48.49x | +88% |
| P/B | 10.02x | 5.44x | +84% |
| P/S | 2.97x | 1.80x | +65% |
| EV/EBITDA | 22.40x | 12.43x | +80% |
| EV/EBIT | 51.26x | 27.50x | +86% |
| EV/Sales | 3.90x | 2.26x | +73% |
| FCF Yield | -14.52% | 0.74% | -2,049% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.38% | 3.66% | -90% |
Only 2 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean PTRO sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap $ 2.6 B + debt $ 850 M − cash $ 72 M + minority interest $ 45 M = $ 3.5 B
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.87 → 1.08 | Machinery (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.32 |
| Cost of equity | 11.85% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 9.03% | median interest coverage 1.9x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a B1/B+ synthetic rating and a 2.75% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 5.2%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 26.9% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 10.57% | 76% E × CoE + 24% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 20.8% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 20.8%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 6.5% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 9.1% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 25.6% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.6% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 23.7% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 10.1% of revenue against depreciation of 9.1%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 6.7% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 20.8% | 16.3% | 11.7% | 7.1% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.5 B | $ 1.6 B |
| EBIT | $ 69 M | $ 81 M | $ 90 M | $ 96 M | $ 99 M | $ 101 M |
| NOPAT | $ 51 M | $ 59 M | $ 66 M | $ 70 M | $ 72 M | $ 74 M |
| + D&A | $ 98 M | $ 113 M | $ 127 M | $ 136 M | $ 139 M | $ 142 M |
| − Capex | $ 275 M | $ 319 M | $ 356 M | $ 382 M | $ 391 M | $ 157 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 12 M | $ 12 M | $ 9.8 M | $ 6.6 M | $ 2.5 M | $ 2.6 M |
| FCFF | -$ 139 M | -$ 159 M | -$ 174 M | -$ 182 M | -$ 183 M | $ 57 M |
| PV | -$ 126 M | -$ 130 M | -$ 129 M | -$ 122 M | -$ 110 M | $ 424 M |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) -$ 616 M + PV(TV) $ 424 M = -$ 193 M · TV -220% of EV · − net debt $ 778 M − minority $ 45 M = equity -$ 1.0 B ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp -1,817/share (-139% vs price Rp 4,709)· exit-multiple check (12.4x): Rp 626
Under these assumptions the model lands 139% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.6% | 10.6% | 11.6% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -1,760 | -1,861 | -1,934 |
| 2.5% | -1,700 | -1,817 | -1,902 |
| 3.0% | -1,629 | -1,767 | -1,865 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 416 M | $ 476 M | $ 578 M | $ 691 M | $ 886 M |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 341 M | $ 382 M | $ 495 M | $ 601 M | $ 774 M |
| Gross Profit | $ 74 M | $ 95 M | $ 83 M | $ 90 M | $ 112 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 45 M | $ 60 M | $ 36 M | $ 38 M | $ 67 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 5.0 M | $ 6.2 M | $ 19 M | $ 21 M | $ 44 M |
| Net Income | $ 34 M | $ 41 M | $ 12 M | $ 9.7 M | $ 29 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 34 M | $ 41 M | $ 12 M | $ 9.7 M | $ 29 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 54 M | $ 53 M | $ 58 M | $ 51 M | $ 87 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 89 M | $ 62 M | $ 73 M | $ 115 M | $ 72 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 92 M | $ 119 M | $ 156 M | $ 172 M | $ 329 M |
| Inventory | $ 9.1 M | $ 19 M | $ 19 M | $ 19 M | $ 21 M |
| Current Assets | $ 232 M | $ 258 M | $ 316 M | $ 356 M | $ 559 M |
| Total Assets | $ 533 M | $ 596 M | $ 728 M | $ 867 M | $ 1.6 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 68 M | $ 119 M | $ 140 M | $ 120 M | $ 284 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 167 M | $ 222 M | $ 272 M | $ 228 M | $ 438 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 273 M | $ 298 M | $ 492 M | $ 618 M | $ 1.3 B |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 136 M | $ 116 M | $ 251 M | $ 398 M | $ 850 M |
| Total Equity | $ 260 M | $ 298 M | $ 236 M | $ 250 M | $ 307 M |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 259 M | $ 297 M | $ 235 M | $ 249 M | $ 263 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 110 M | $ 89 M | $ 108 M | $ 28 M | $ 48 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 42 M | $ 54 M | $ 62 M | $ 122 M | $ 430 M |
PTRO is a leveraged bet on backlog conversion. The order book (~US$4.5bn, roughly 5× FY2025 revenue, with marquee third-party wins: Freeport, Vale’s 10-year Bahodopi overburden contract, BP Berau) gives multi-year revenue visibility that most contractors never get; revenue compounded ~20.9%/yr to US$886.5m (FY2021–25). But the build has been paid for with the balance sheet: debt rose from US$136m to US$850m, D/E from 0.52× to 2.76×, interest coverage collapsed from 8.9× to 1.52×, and FY2025 free cash flow was −US$382m (capex US$430m; 48.5% of revenue). The headline “+197% profit surge” flatters a trough base: FY2025 net income (US$28.8m) is still below FY2021’s (US$33.7m), and the operating margin (7.6%) remains well under the pre-takeover 10.7–12.6%. What would prove the bull case wrong: interest coverage failing to re-widen above ~2× as the new fleet seasons, or margins on the new volume staying at FY2023–24 levels (5.5–6.3%); either would mean the backlog was bought, not won. What would prove the bear case wrong: two years of backlog conversion at ≥8–9% operating margin with capex normalizing toward D&A (~US$87m); deleveraging then happens fast.
Prequalified tenders for multi-year mining scopes (per-bcm overburden, per-tonne coal) and lump-sum/unit-price EPC.
EconomicsThe margin is fixed here: rates won in 2024–25 across ~US$3.4bn of awards set FY2026–29 profitability before a single bcm moves.
Excavators, haul trucks, support fleet and camp/site infrastructure deployed against each new scope.
EconomicsThe capital block: US$430m capex in FY2025 alone (48.5% of revenue), debt-funded; depreciation then runs ~US$87m/yr through the P&L.
Drill & blast, overburden removal, coal getting, hauling: paid on volume delivered.
EconomicsCash cost = fuel + parts + labor; fuel is only partly passed through, so oil spikes (Brent hit US$120 in April 2026) bite the margin directly.
Process plants and mining infrastructure (BP Berau, Vale Pomalaa HPAL); offshore oil & gas EPCI added in FY2025.
EconomicsEngineering margin with execution risk: cost overruns are borne by PTRO on lump-sum scopes; 42.8% of FY2025 revenue.
Invoice miners (including related parties), then roll the fleet into the next scope: utilization between contracts is the silent ROIC driver.
EconomicsReceivables-led working capital; idle fleet earns nothing while depreciation and interest keep running.
Cost structureFuel, parts and labor dominate cash costs; depreciation (~9.8% of revenue) and now interest (US$44.4m, 5.0% of revenue) are the fixed block that makes utilization decisive. Operating margin 7.6% (FY2025) against 10.7–12.6% pre-transition shows how much of the cost base is currently under-absorbed by the still-seasoning fleet.
Cash cycleCash flows in on progress billings and volume certificates (receivables from large miners; slow but bankable) and flows out years earlier as fleet capex: OCF covered only 11% of FY2025 capex (US$48.2m vs US$430m). The cycle inverts, by design, only when the bought fleet is fully deployed against the backlog.
Unit economicsPaid per bcm of overburden moved and per tonne of coal delivered; profitability per unit = contracted rate − fuel/parts/labor cash cost − allocated fleet depreciation. The FY2021–22 vintage earned ~11–13% operating margins on this equation; the current vintage’s true unit economics surface as the new contracts season through FY2026.
Fleet OEMs (Komatsu, Caterpillar, increasingly SANY/Chinese brands) set equipment prices, and fuel is a pass-through only in part. Chinese entrants are cutting fleet capex costs across the industry.
Implication → Cheaper Chinese fleet cuts entry capex for everyone: good for PTRO’s build cost, bad for the capital barrier that protects incumbents.
Clients are large, concentrated miners (Freeport, Vale, BP, Sinar Mas, Barito-orbit coal) who run competitive tenders and hold rate power; several are related parties, which secures volume but not necessarily price.
Implication → Thin operating margins (5.5–7.6% since 2023) are the direct print of buyer power: the growth thesis depends on rates won in 2024–25 being economic, which is not yet visible.
Fleet capital intensity (PTRO just spent US$430m in one year) and safety/track-record prequalification are real barriers; cheaper Chinese equipment and miner-backed startups erode them.
Implication → The barrier is capital + credentials, not technology: defensible only while utilization and safety stats stay bankable.
The substitute is the owner-operator model: big miners can insource (UNTR’s PAMA exists precisely because contracting economics are attractive to capture in-house).
Implication → Long-dated contracts (Vale’s 10-year Bahodopi) are the defense: they lock scope before clients contemplate insourcing.
PAMA (UNTR) dominates scale, BUMA (DOID) and a long tail of contractors bid every tender; rate discipline is the entire margin game.
Implication → Winning US$3.4bn of new work in 2024–25 proves competitiveness; whether it proves PRICED competitiveness shows up in margins from FY2026 on.
Earnings are operational, but the FY2025 headline flatters: “+197%” measures off the FY2024 trough (US$9.7m), and the US$28.8m result is still below FY2021’s US$33.7m on a revenue base 2.1× larger; margin, not demand, is the constraint. No large disclosed one-off drives FY2025; the coal-sales line (US$52m, shrinking) is the only non-service revenue. The real quality question is prospective: whether the 2024–25 contract vintage prices at economic rates.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionAccrual quality is sound, OCF (US$48.2m) exceeds net income (US$28.8m) at 1.7×, but conversion to FREE cash is deeply negative (−US$382m) because of the fleet build. The strain is investment, not earnings fabrication; watch receivables growth against the related-party order book as volumes scale.
An unambiguous builder: currently building below the cost of capital. ROIC ran 12–13% in FY2021–22, then 4–6% through the build against a USD cost of capital around 11%; the entire allocation case rests on the seasoned fleet returning ROIC above that bar from FY2026. The FY2023 control-transition year also saw a ~US$75m equity outflow (equity fell US$62m despite positive earnings): consistent with a large distribution around the ownership change; the seeded lines do not disclose its exact composition.
DeploymentFY2023–25 cumulative capex US$614m against cumulative OCF of US$184m; the US$430m gap (plus the HBS acquisition, US$25.8m) was debt-funded: total debt rose from US$116m (FY2022) to US$850m (FY2025). Dividends have been de-emphasized in the build phase.
Returns trendROIC 12.4% → 13.0% → 6.2% → 4.2% → 6.2% (FY2021–25). The FY2025 uptick is the first evidence the build can pay; it must clear PTRO’s own company-specific WACC (~9.7%, CAPM-derived: see Valuation) to have created value, and comfortably clear the flat USD sensitivity band (9.3–13.3%) for the case to be unambiguous.
Control (Kreasi Jasa Persada, 45.33%, Prajogo Pangestu orbit) and a meaningful share of the order book (CUAN-linked Daya Bumindo Karunia ~Rp17.4tn scope, other Barito-orbit mines) sit on the same side of the table; contract terms with related mines are not independently observable. Mitigant: the 2024–25 vintage added marquee third-party clients (Freeport, Vale, BP, Sinar Mas) that dilute the concentration.
D/E 2.76×, interest coverage 1.52×, interest expense up 8.9× in four years: the thinnest solvency cushion in the heavy-equipment group, assumed at the top of the rate cycle.
FCF −US$34m (FY2023), −US$94m (FY2024), −US$382m (FY2025): by design (fleet build), but three consecutive negative years leave no internal buffer if margins disappoint.
Minority interest jumped from ~US$1m to ~US$45m in FY2025 (14.6% of total equity) alongside the PNG acquisition and new subsidiary structures: consolidated figures now modestly overstate owners’ economics; NI attribution remains ~100% owners in FY2025.
Checked the FY2025 profit build against the seeded statement lines and reported segments: no material one-off found; the recovery is operating-driven (volume + partial margin repair).
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's heavy equipment market is dominated by mining (coal, nickel, gold): which drives ~70 % of unit demand. UNTR (United Tractors) controls ~50 % of the market through Komatsu distribution, PAMA mining contracting, and Martabe gold mining. Chinese brands (SANY 22 %) are rapidly eroding the Japanese OEM premium.