Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 108.46x | 28.12x | 12.53x | 13.51x | 11.78x |
| Interest burdendriver | 0.05x | 0.26x | 0.22x | 0.32x | 0.35x |
| Operating margin | 4.8% | 5.4% | 5.9% | 7.0% | 6.7% |
| Asset turnover | 0.32x | 0.32x | 0.30x | 0.26x | 0.25x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.80x | 1.60x | 1.51x | 1.44x | 1.33x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 14.1% | 20.9% | 7.2% | 11.1% | 9.3% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 1.9% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.19x | 1.23x | 1.24x | 1.31x | 1.27x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.77x | 0.82x | 0.88x | 0.89x | 0.75x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.30x | 0.30x | 0.31x | 0.32x | 0.25x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 128 M | $ 156 M | $ 143 M | $ 188 M | $ 136 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.64x | 0.46x | 0.41x | 0.33x | 0.24x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.80x | 0.60x | 0.51x | 0.44x | 0.33x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.36x | 0.29x | 0.27x | 0.23x | 0.18x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 928 M | $ 826 M | $ 797 M | $ 682 M | $ 591 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 1.05x | 1.36x | 1.28x | 1.46x | 1.55x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.80x | 1.60x | 1.51x | 1.44x | 1.33x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 13.5% | 13.7% | 13.1% | 14.8% | 15.1% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 4.8% | 5.4% | 5.9% | 7.0% | 6.7% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 24.2% | 40.5% | 16.0% | 30.2% | 28.0% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 130 M | $ 141 M | $ 134 M | $ 123 M | $ 117 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 12.7% | 12.3% | 12.5% | 12.5% | 11.9% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 7.9% | 13.1% | 4.8% | 7.7% | 7.0% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 14.1% | 20.9% | 7.2% | 11.1% | 9.3% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 108.46x | 28.12x | 12.53x | 13.51x | 11.78x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.05x | 0.26x | 0.22x | 0.32x | 0.35x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 1.8% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 1.9% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.32x | 0.32x | 0.30x | 0.26x | 0.25x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 3.14x | 3.48x | 4.28x | 3.30x | 3.24x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 21.40x | 11.74x | 15.06x | 8.93x | 44.53x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 6.19x | 5.25x | 7.64x | 4.13x | 5.26x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 116.3 days | 105.0 days | 85.3 days | 110.5 days | 112.7 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 17.1 days | 31.1 days | 24.2 days | 40.9 days | 8.2 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 59.0 days | 69.5 days | 47.8 days | 88.5 days | 69.4 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 74.4 days | 66.5 days | 61.7 days | 62.9 days | 51.5 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 62 M | $ 73 M | $ 17 M | $ 50 M | $ 21 M |
Price Rp 6,508 · market cap Rp 20 T ($ 1.1 B at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | TKIM | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 4.06x | 4.84x | -16% |
| P/B | 0.38x | 0.38x | +1% |
| P/S | 1.14x | 0.97x | +17% |
| EV/EBITDA | 14.63x | 10.65x | +37% |
| EV/EBIT | 25.85x | 17.35x | +49% |
| EV/Sales | 1.74x | 1.80x | -3% |
| FCF Yield | 1.88% | 1.60% | +17% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.38% | 0.49% | -22% |
Only 2 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean TKIM sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap $ 1.1 B + debt $ 716 M − cash $ 125 M = $ 1.7 B
At today’s price, the market is paying for 30.1%/yr FCF growth (25.2% at 9.3% to 34.4% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -23.6% FCF · -1.0% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Mechanical DCF suppressed: on these default assumptions the modelled enterprise value falls BELOW net debt and minority interests, so the equity residual is negative. Equity cannot be worth less than nothing, so no per-share figure is published here: read it as the model saying the debt claims consume the whole enterprise at this discount rate and growth path, which is itself the signal. The components are shown below so the arithmetic stays checkable, and the sliders let you test what it would take to change the answer.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 30 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.72 → 1.08 | Paper/Forest Products (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.64 |
| Cost of equity | 11.88% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 11.37% | median interest coverage 1.4x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a B3/B- synthetic rating and a 5.09% default spread, over a 6.28% base (US 10Y 4.66% + Indonesia's 1.62% sovereign spread). Its BOOK rate is 6.0%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 22.0% | statutory 22% (no clean effective-rate year in window) |
| WACC | 10.70% | 61% E × CoE + 39% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (-1.0%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 6.0% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 5.7% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 7.2% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.7% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 23.4% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 6.7% of revenue against depreciation of 5.7%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 7.0% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B |
| EBIT | $ 60 M | $ 62 M | $ 63 M | $ 65 M | $ 67 M | $ 68 M |
| NOPAT | $ 47 M | $ 48 M | $ 49 M | $ 51 M | $ 52 M | $ 53 M |
| + D&A | $ 58 M | $ 59 M | $ 61 M | $ 62 M | $ 64 M | $ 66 M |
| − Capex | $ 72 M | $ 74 M | $ 76 M | $ 78 M | $ 80 M | $ 76 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 1.7 M | $ 1.8 M | $ 1.8 M | $ 1.9 M | $ 1.9 M | $ 1.9 M |
| FCFF | $ 31 M | $ 32 M | $ 32 M | $ 33 M | $ 34 M | $ 41 M |
| PV | $ 28 M | $ 26 M | $ 24 M | $ 22 M | $ 21 M | $ 299 M |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) $ 120 M + PV(TV) $ 299 M = $ 419 M · TV 71% of EV · − net debt $ 591 M − minority $ 0 = equity -$ 172 M ÷ shares outstanding · per share is in USD, shown in IDR at 18,058
Model output: Rp -997/share (-115% vs price Rp 6,508)· exit-multiple check (10.7x): Rp 2,122
Under these assumptions the model lands 115% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 9.7% | 10.7% | 11.7% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | -795 | -1,109 | -1,358 |
| 2.5% | -646 | -997 | -1,271 |
| 3.0% | -475 | -870 | -1,174 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 1.0 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.1 B | $ 985 M | $ 985 M |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 886 M | $ 987 M | $ 934 M | $ 839 M | $ 836 M |
| Gross Profit | $ 139 M | $ 156 M | $ 140 M | $ 146 M | $ 149 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 49 M | $ 62 M | $ 63 M | $ 69 M | $ 66 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 46 M | $ 46 M | $ 50 M | $ 47 M | $ 43 M |
| Net Income | $ 248 M | $ 463 M | $ 172 M | $ 297 M | $ 276 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 248 M | $ 463 M | $ 172 M | $ 297 M | $ 276 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 81 M | $ 78 M | $ 71 M | $ 54 M | $ 51 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 206 M | $ 205 M | $ 188 M | $ 194 M | $ 125 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 48 M | $ 97 M | $ 71 M | $ 110 M | $ 22 M |
| Inventory | $ 282 M | $ 284 M | $ 218 M | $ 254 M | $ 258 M |
| Current Assets | $ 805 M | $ 851 M | $ 749 M | $ 792 M | $ 630 M |
| Total Assets | $ 3.2 B | $ 3.5 B | $ 3.6 B | $ 3.9 B | $ 3.9 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 143 M | $ 188 M | $ 122 M | $ 203 M | $ 159 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 678 M | $ 694 M | $ 607 M | $ 604 M | $ 494 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 1.4 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.2 B | $ 972 M |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 1.1 B | $ 1.0 B | $ 985 M | $ 877 M | $ 716 M |
| Total Equity | $ 1.8 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.9 B |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 1.8 B | $ 2.2 B | $ 2.4 B | $ 2.7 B | $ 2.9 B |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 98 M | $ 121 M | $ 100 M | $ 90 M | $ 115 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 36 M | $ 47 M | $ 83 M | $ 41 M | $ 94 M |
TKIM (Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia) is an Asia Pulp & Paper (APP)/Sinar Mas Group paper converter; unlike sister company INKP, it buys pulp as an input rather than producing its own, making cultural paper (printing/writing paper) its majority revenue line alongside industrial paper (fluting medium, carton boxes). Its own paper-conversion operations are thin-margin (operating margin 4.76-7.04% across FY2021-2025) with correspondingly thin interest coverage (1.05-1.55x), but its reported net margin (16.02-40.52%) runs a multiple of its operating margin every single year, from 2.7x to 7.5x, because a large, recurring equity-method investment income line ($165.5M-$387.6M) is consistently bigger than TKIM's own operating income ($48.8M-$69.3M). This is the dominant driver of TKIM's reported profitability, not the paper-conversion business itself, and it is not primarily an FX effect (currency gains are a separate, much smaller line, -$12.4M to $57.1M across the same years). On the balance sheet, TKIM has deleveraged every single year (debt-to-equity 0.6447x in FY2021 to 0.2427x in FY2025, net debt from $928.1M to $590.9M): a genuinely clean, consistent trend. A real Gate-2 finding from this batch: TKIM's own OJK filings are genuinely denominated in Indonesian Rupiah (multiple independent Indonesian-language sources quote precise native figures; 9-month 2025 revenue Rp12,327,104,400,000, FY2025 net income Rp4.63T, down from FY2024's Rp4.83T), but Neraca's seed source (stockanalysis.com) silently auto-converts TKIM's financials-page display to USD; the figures shown here are faithful to TKIM's real Rupiah economics (verified via convergent FX back-calculation, ~16,690-16,787 IDR/USD) but will not directly match TKIM's own filed currency.
Unlike INKP, TKIM does not own a plantation-fed fiber base: it buys pulp as an open-market input, a real and materially greater supplier dependency than its integrated sister company.
Implication → TKIM's thin operating margin (4.8-7.0%) is directly consistent with this cost-structure disadvantage relative to INKP.
Paper is a globally-traded commodity; TKIM's buyers can source elsewhere at world prices.
Implication → Caps TKIM's pricing power on its core paper-conversion business: evident in its persistently thin operating margin across all five years shown.
Paper conversion (without owning a fiber base) requires less capital than INKP's integrated model, though still meaningful barriers at TKIM's scale: this narrative found no evidence of a comparably-scaled new domestic entrant.
Implication → A real, if smaller, threat-of-entry exposure than INKP faces, consistent with TKIM's less capital-intensive, non-integrated business model.
Cultural/printing paper is TKIM's majority revenue segment, making it more concentrated in the industry's most digital-substitution-exposed product category than INKP's more diversified mix.
Implication → TKIM carries the industry's most concentrated long-run digital-substitution risk on its core operating business, even though this risk is currently masked by its large equity-income overlay.
Competes in the global paper market against far larger integrated producers, including its own sister company INKP and international majors: direct cause of TKIM's persistently thin 4.8-7.0% operating margin.
Implication → TKIM's core business is a margin-taker in a highly competitive, non-integrated corner of the industry: its investment-income overlay, not this segment, is what makes its headline returns look strong.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Dominated by two Asia Pulp & Paper (Sinar Mas Group) subsidiaries with genuinely different economics: an integrated pulp-and-paper exporter mid-way through a $3.6B capacity expansion, and a paper-only converter whose reported profit is driven more by equity-method investment income than its own thin operating margins; under a parent group whose 2013 "zero deforestation" pledge was found broken by a 2023 Greenpeace investigation.