Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.64x | 0.50x | 0.61x | 0.62x | 0.59x |
| Interest burden | 0.90x | 0.91x | 0.90x | 0.87x | 0.85x |
| Operating margindriver | 30.2% | 30.7% | 30.1% | 27.7% | 24.1% |
| Asset turnover | 0.52x | 0.54x | 0.52x | 0.51x | 0.51x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 1.91x | 1.84x | 1.83x | 1.89x | 1.91x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 17.1% | 13.9% | 15.7% | 14.5% | 11.8% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 15.7% | 12.7% | 14.0% | 13.0% | 10.9% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 0.89x | 0.78x | 0.78x | 0.82x | 0.84x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 0.88x | 0.77x | 0.76x | 0.81x | 0.82x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.55x | 0.45x | 0.41x | 0.44x | 0.46x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | -Rp 7.9 T | -Rp 15 T | -Rp 16 T | -Rp 14 T | -Rp 12 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.48x | 0.42x | 0.44x | 0.50x | 0.50x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.91x | 0.84x | 0.83x | 0.89x | 0.91x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.25x | 0.23x | 0.24x | 0.26x | 0.26x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 31 T | Rp 31 T | Rp 39 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 41 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 9.86x | 11.09x | 9.65x | 7.97x | 6.80x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.91x | 1.84x | 1.83x | 1.89x | 1.91x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 62.6% | 62.9% | 61.0% | 60.0% | 59.8% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 30.2% | 30.7% | 30.1% | 27.7% | 24.1% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 17.4% | 14.1% | 16.5% | 14.9% | 12.1% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 75 T | Rp 71 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 68 T | Rp 65 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 52.4% | 48.2% | 46.9% | 45.1% | 44.0% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 9.0% | 7.5% | 8.6% | 7.7% | 6.2% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 20.5% | 16.0% | 18.1% | 16.7% | 13.6% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.64x | 0.50x | 0.61x | 0.62x | 0.59x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.90x | 0.91x | 0.90x | 0.87x | 0.85x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 15.7% | 12.7% | 14.0% | 13.0% | 10.9% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.52x | 0.54x | 0.52x | 0.51x | 0.51x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 68.72x | 47.78x | 58.41x | 54.75x | 65.53x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 13.21x | 13.28x | 11.16x | 10.24x | 10.86x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 20.20x | 22.77x | 19.18x | 23.10x | 17.59x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 5.3 days | 7.6 days | 6.2 days | 6.7 days | 5.6 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 27.6 days | 27.5 days | 32.7 days | 35.6 days | 33.6 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 18.1 days | 16.0 days | 19.0 days | 15.8 days | 20.8 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 14.9 days | 19.1 days | 19.9 days | 26.5 days | 18.4 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 38 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 41 T |
Price Rp 2,630 · market cap Rp 260 T
| Multiple | TLKM | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 14.60x | 12.86x(2/3) | +14% |
| P/B | 1.99x | 1.69x | +18% |
| P/S | 1.77x | 1.08x | +63% |
| EV/EBITDA | 4.97x | 5.44x | -9% |
| EV/EBIT | 9.05x | 9.83x(2/3) | -8% |
| EV/Sales | 2.18x | 2.18x | 0% |
| FCF Yield | 15.76% | 15.76% | 0% |
| Dividend Yield | 8.08% | 8.08% | 0% |
Only 3 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean TLKM sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap Rp 260 T + debt Rp 75 T − cash Rp 34 T + minority interest Rp 20 T = Rp 321 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for 0.4%/yr FCF growth (-2.3% at 12.0% to 3.0% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 1.6% FCF · 0.6% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2022: Unrealized mark-to-market loss on the GOTO investment (via Telkomsel) depressed reported net income. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.37 → 0.44 | Telecom. Services (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.29 |
| Cost of equity | 10.20% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 7.66% | median interest coverage 9.6x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.9%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 35.0% | median effective rate FY2021–FY2025 computed to 39.0%, CLAMPED to 35%: above that ceiling the pretax approximation is carrying minority interests, which are already deducted separately from enterprise value, rather than tax |
| WACC | 9.03% | 78% E × CoE + 22% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 0.6% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 0.6%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 27.3% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 18.0% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 18.5% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 9.0% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 27.7% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 21.4% of revenue against depreciation of 18.0%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 64.6% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 0.6% | 1.1% | 1.6% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 148 T | Rp 149 T | Rp 152 T | Rp 155 T | Rp 158 T | Rp 162 T |
| EBIT | Rp 40 T | Rp 41 T | Rp 41 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 44 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 26 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 29 T |
| + D&A | Rp 27 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 29 T |
| − Capex | Rp 27 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 35 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 579 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.0 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.6 T |
| FCFF | Rp 25 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 21 T |
| PV | Rp 23 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 16 T | Rp 207 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 96 T + PV(TV) Rp 207 T = Rp 304 T · TV 68% of EV · − net debt Rp 41 T − minority Rp 20 T = equity Rp 243 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp 2,459/share (-7% vs price Rp 2,630)· exit-multiple check (5.4x): Rp 2,930
Under these assumptions the model lands close to today's price. The market and these inputs are telling broadly the same story.
| g \ WACC | 8.0% | 9.0% | 10.0% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 2,785 | 2,327 | 1,982 |
| 2.5% | 2,980 | 2,459 | 2,075 |
| 3.0% | 3,213 | 2,612 | 2,181 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 143 T | Rp 147 T | Rp 149 T | Rp 150 T | Rp 147 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 54 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 58 T | Rp 60 T | Rp 59 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 90 T | Rp 93 T | Rp 91 T | Rp 90 T | Rp 88 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 43 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 35 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 5.2 T | Rp 5.2 T |
| Net Income | Rp 25 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 18 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 25 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 18 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 32 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 29 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 38 T | Rp 32 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 34 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 11 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 14 T |
| Inventory | Rp 779 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 997 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 901 M |
| Current Assets | Rp 61 T | Rp 55 T | Rp 56 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 62 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 277 T | Rp 275 T | Rp 287 T | Rp 291 T | Rp 288 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 2.4 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 3.4 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 69 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 72 T | Rp 77 T | Rp 74 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 132 T | Rp 126 T | Rp 130 T | Rp 137 T | Rp 137 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 69 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 68 T | Rp 77 T | Rp 75 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 145 T | Rp 149 T | Rp 157 T | Rp 154 T | Rp 151 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 122 T | Rp 129 T | Rp 136 T | Rp 134 T | Rp 131 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 68 T | Rp 73 T | Rp 61 T | Rp 62 T | Rp 64 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 30 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 23 T |
TLKM is the scale leader of Indonesian telecom, spanning Telkomsel in mobile, IndiHome in fixed broadband, and a growing infrastructure arm (towers through Mitratel, data centres through NeutraDC). The story of the last few years is margin compression: operating margin slid 30%→24% and EBITDA margin 52%→44% (FY21–25), which dragged ROE 20.5%→13.6% and ROIC 15.7%→10.9% as data traffic outgrew monetisation and price competition bit into pricing. Even so, it remains highly cash-generative (FCF ~Rp41tn, FY25) and conservatively financed (D/E ~0.5, interest cover ~6.8x). Think of it as a defensive, dividend-paying infrastructure holding whose re-rating hinges on monetising data and crystallising the value of the infraco; the risk is that margin erosion simply continues.
Spectrum + towers (Mitratel) + fiber + data centers (NeutraDC) + retail brands (Telkomsel, IndiHome): the only Indonesian carrier owning the full stack.
EconomicsFull-stack ownership gives a cost floor competitors rent from: at the price of ~Rp23–35tn/yr of capex carried on TLKM’s own balance sheet.
Data traffic grows double-digit while revenue is flat: Rp143.2tn→Rp146.7tn over FIVE years (+2.4% cumulative); the “more-for-less” trap in one line.
EconomicsOperating margin paid the bill: 30.2%→24.1%, with FY2025 alone giving up 3.6pp.
OCF held Rp60–73tn every single year of the window: the cash engine is untouched by the margin story.
EconomicsWith capex CUT from Rp35.0tn (FY2022) to Rp22.9tn, FCF rose to ~Rp41tn (FY2025): a 15.8% FCF yield at the snapshot price.
High payout (~70%+ of falling earnings) plus the structural lever: Mitratel and NeutraDC are separable infrastructure value inside the consolidated P&L.
EconomicsEquity flat at ~Rp150tn across five years: everything generated above the dividend went back into the network.
Cost structureCapex-and-depreciation dominated: D&A ~18% of revenue and network opex lead; the margin decline is PRICE (revenue per GB), not cost indiscipline; costs held while pricing fell.
Cash cyclePrepaid-heavy: customers pay before consuming, suppliers are paid on terms; the working-capital cycle is a cash SOURCE, which is why OCF (Rp60–73tn) persistently towers over net income (Rp18–25tn).
Network-equipment vendors (Ericsson/Huawei/Nokia) and spectrum (the government) carry pricing power; TLKM’s scale gives some leverage.
Implication → Equipment and spectrum costs pressure capex and margins; scale only partly offsets.
Consumers are price-sensitive with low switching costs (prepaid, number portability); intense competition caps ARPU. This is the core margin pressure.
Implication → The primary cause of ARPU and margin compression: it directly limits pricing power.
Spectrum scarcity, capex and nationwide coverage are huge barriers; the market is a consolidated oligopoly (Telkomsel, Indosat/IOH, XLSmart).
Implication → The oligopoly structure shields incumbents from new disruptors.
OTT apps gutted voice/SMS; Wi-Fi and fixed substitute for mobile data. TLKM is partly disintermediated to a "pipe" for OTT traffic.
Implication → Value migrates to OTT; TLKM risks a low-margin "pipe" role unless it climbs the stack (infra, enterprise, data centres).
A three-player price war post-consolidation; competition on data pricing pressures ARPU and margins across the sector.
Implication → The price war is the key drag on ROIC (now ~10.9%): pricing discipline is the swing factor.
Cash-backed but declining: every rupiah of reported profit is covered ~3x by operating cash, and the decline is genuine operating compression, not accounting. The one distortion in the window sits in FY2022, marked below.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2022 | Unrealized mark-to-market loss on the GOTO investment (via Telkomsel) depressed reported net income | NI fell Rp24.9tn→Rp20.7tn while OCF ROSE to Rp73.4tn: the divergence is the tell; FY2023 rebounded to Rp24.6tn. |
Cash conversionOCF/NI ran 2.4x–3.6x every year: among the strongest conversion in the dataset; capex is the only true claim on it.
Disciplined in cash, unresolved in strategy: cutting capex Rp35tn→Rp23tn while holding OCF is real allocation skill, and the ~Rp41tn FCF funds the dividend easily. But ROIC slid 15.7%→10.9% against a 9.0% WACC: the reinvested network earns a narrowing spread, and the infraco value (towers, data centers) stays trapped inside the conglomerate P&L.
DeploymentFY2021→25: ~Rp147tn cumulative capex into network/5G/fiber, dividends ~Rp15–18tn/yr, equity deliberately flat (~Rp150tn); no buybacks, no M&A of scale, the AADI-style structural move (infraco monetization) still optional.
Returns trendROIC 15.7→12.7→14.0→13.0→10.9%: the FY2025 print sits 1.9pp above WACC; still value-creating, but four of five years point one direction. The dividend is safe on FCF; the VALUATION depends on stopping this line.
10.9% vs 9.0%: a 1.9pp spread, from 6.7pp in FY2021. The record’s own slope is the risk; the reverse DCF prices only 0.6%/yr growth, so the market already assumes it.
Five years, +2.4% cumulative revenue on double-digit traffic growth: the industry’s pricing has not rationalized despite three-player consolidation.
9.9x→6.8x on stable debt: entirely an EBIT story, not a leverage one; comfortable level, wrong direction.
Majority state ownership sets USO obligations and pricing sensitivities; checked the record: no balance-sheet distortion visible, the exposure is policy, not accounting.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
A saturated (>120% penetration), now-consolidated three-player mobile market worth ~USD14bn: competing on data value, not subscribers, with infraco (towers, data centres) the new growth layer.