Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.73x | 0.74x | 0.71x | 0.76x | 0.72x |
| Interest burden | 0.97x | 0.99x | 0.98x | 0.95x | 0.94x |
| Operating margin | 18.2% | 23.3% | 22.9% | 20.2% | 16.6% |
| Asset turnover | 0.71x | 0.88x | 0.84x | 0.79x | 0.74x |
| Leverage (equity mult.)driver | 1.57x | 1.57x | 1.83x | 1.73x | 1.72x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 14.3% | 23.5% | 24.5% | 19.9% | 14.4% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 14.8% | 23.7% | 24.9% | 21.0% | 15.3% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.99x | 1.88x | 1.46x | 1.54x | 1.36x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 1.68x | 1.51x | 1.06x | 1.17x | 1.04x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 1.09x | 0.91x | 0.43x | 0.55x | 0.50x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 30 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 19 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.13x | 0.03x | 0.22x | 0.21x | 0.18x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 0.57x | 0.57x | 0.83x | 0.73x | 0.72x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.08x | 0.02x | 0.12x | 0.12x | 0.11x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | -Rp 24 T | -Rp 35 T | Rp 278 M | -Rp 4.9 T | -Rp 7.7 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 33.52x | 100.41x | 51.62x | 19.02x | 16.79x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 1.57x | 1.57x | 1.83x | 1.73x | 1.72x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 24.7% | 28.1% | 27.8% | 25.2% | 22.6% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 18.2% | 23.3% | 22.9% | 20.2% | 16.6% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 12.9% | 17.0% | 16.0% | 14.5% | 11.3% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 22 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 33 T |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 28.0% | 29.3% | 29.3% | 27.9% | 25.2% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 9.1% | 15.0% | 13.4% | 11.5% | 8.3% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 15.0% | 24.8% | 26.0% | 21.0% | 15.1% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.73x | 0.74x | 0.71x | 0.76x | 0.72x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.97x | 0.99x | 0.98x | 0.95x | 0.94x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 14.8% | 23.7% | 24.9% | 21.0% | 15.3% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.71x | 0.88x | 0.84x | 0.79x | 0.74x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 6.32x | 5.77x | 5.40x | 5.92x | 6.07x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 6.51x | 7.00x | 6.31x | 6.67x | 6.58x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 4.12x | 3.58x | 3.19x | 3.47x | 3.47x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 57.7 days | 63.2 days | 67.6 days | 61.7 days | 60.1 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 56.1 days | 52.2 days | 57.9 days | 54.7 days | 55.4 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 88.6 days | 102.1 days | 114.5 days | 105.2 days | 105.3 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 25.2 days | 13.3 days | 11.0 days | 11.2 days | 10.3 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 20 T | Rp 24 T | Rp 7.5 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 13 T |
Price Rp 23,971 · market cap Rp 84 T
| Multiple | UNTR | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 5.65x | 48.49x | -88% |
| P/B | 0.86x | 5.44x | -84% |
| P/S | 0.64x | 1.80x | -65% |
| EV/EBITDA | 2.46x | 12.43x | -80% |
| EV/EBIT | 3.73x | 27.50x | -86% |
| EV/Sales | 0.62x | 2.26x | -73% |
| FCF Yield | 16.01% | 0.74% | +2,049% |
| Dividend Yield | 6.94% | 3.66% | +90% |
Only 2 peers are covered here, so the median is itself one of the members. A 0% gap can simply mean UNTR sits at the median.
EV = mkt cap Rp 84 T + debt Rp 19 T − cash Rp 27 T + minority interest Rp 5.4 T = Rp 81 T
At today’s price, the market is paying for -3.7%/yr FCF growth (-6.3% at 12.0% to -1.3% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -9.8% FCF · 13.4% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Base year contains named one-off item(s): FY2026: Subsequent event: Martabe gold mine permit revoked, then reinstated. The EBIT basis screens out most non-operating items, but read the Earnings Quality section before trusting the base margin.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.87 → 1.01 | Machinery (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.23 |
| Cost of equity | 14.05% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 7.66% | median interest coverage 33.5x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aaa/AAA synthetic rating and a 0.40% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.9%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms) |
| Tax rate | 26.7% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 12.49% | 82% E × CoE + 18% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 13.4% | delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 13.4%, fading linearly to terminal |
| EBIT margin | 19.9% | mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs |
| D&A / revenue | 7.5% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 11.7% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 12.5% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 20.0% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 10.4% of revenue against depreciation of 7.5%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 3.7% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 13.4% | 10.7% | 7.9% | 5.2% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 149 T | Rp 165 T | Rp 178 T | Rp 187 T | Rp 192 T | Rp 197 T |
| EBIT | Rp 30 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 37 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 39 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 22 T | Rp 24 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 28 T | Rp 29 T |
| + D&A | Rp 11 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 14 T | Rp 15 T |
| − Capex | Rp 17 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 22 T | Rp 20 T |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 649 M | Rp 586 M | Rp 483 M | Rp 343 M | Rp 173 M | Rp 177 M |
| FCFF | Rp 15 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 23 T |
| PV | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 12 T | Rp 11 T | Rp 128 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 62 T + PV(TV) Rp 128 T = Rp 190 T · TV 67% of EV · − net debt -Rp 7.7 T − minority Rp 5.4 T = equity Rp 192 T ÷ shares outstanding
Model output: Rp 55,037/share (+130% vs price Rp 23,971)· exit-multiple check (12.4x): Rp 122,614
Under these assumptions the model lands 130% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 11.5% | 12.5% | 13.5% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 58,513 | 52,701 | 47,913 |
| 2.5% | 61,429 | 55,037 | 49,820 |
| 3.0% | 64,688 | 57,618 | 51,909 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 79 T | Rp 124 T | Rp 129 T | Rp 134 T | Rp 131 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 60 T | Rp 89 T | Rp 93 T | Rp 101 T | Rp 102 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 20 T | Rp 35 T | Rp 36 T | Rp 34 T | Rp 30 T |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 14 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 27 T | Rp 22 T |
| Interest Expense | Rp 431 M | Rp 287 M | Rp 571 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.3 T |
| Net Income | Rp 10 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 15 T |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 10 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 21 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 15 T |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 7.8 T | Rp 7.4 T | Rp 8.2 T | Rp 10 T | Rp 11 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 33 T | Rp 38 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 27 T |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 12 T | Rp 18 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 20 T |
| Inventory | Rp 9.5 T | Rp 15 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T | Rp 17 T |
| Current Assets | Rp 61 T | Rp 79 T | Rp 63 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 72 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 113 T | Rp 140 T | Rp 154 T | Rp 169 T | Rp 178 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 15 T | Rp 25 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 29 T | Rp 29 T |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 30 T | Rp 42 T | Rp 43 T | Rp 45 T | Rp 53 T |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 41 T | Rp 51 T | Rp 70 T | Rp 71 T | Rp 75 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 9.2 T | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 20 T | Rp 19 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 72 T | Rp 90 T | Rp 84 T | Rp 98 T | Rp 103 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 69 T | Rp 85 T | Rp 79 T | Rp 93 T | Rp 98 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 23 T | Rp 33 T | Rp 26 T | Rp 30 T | Rp 27 T |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 3.0 T | Rp 8.9 T | Rp 19 T | Rp 13 T | Rp 14 T |
United Tractors (59% owned by Astra International) is Indonesia's largest heavy-equipment company, spanning four segments: Heavy Equipment (the exclusive Komatsu distributor for Indonesia, selling excavators, bulldozers and motor graders); Mining Contracting (Pamapersada Nusantara, Indonesia's largest mining contractor, running third-party coal mines on a pay-per-ton basis); Mining (UNTR's own coal mines); and Construction (Acset Indonusa). The FY2022–23 peak rode the global coal supercycle, with coal prices above $400/ton in 2022, lifting ROE to 24–26%, ROIC to 23–25%, and FCF to Rp24tn. As coal normalised back toward the ~$100–120/ton range, ROE compressed to 15.1% and ROIC to 15.3% by FY25. The structural strengths are what stand out: near-zero leverage (D/E 0.18), massive FCF even at the bottom of the cycle (Rp13.4tn), and a dominant position in Indonesian heavy equipment that the commodity cycle does not structurally impair. It is a high-quality cyclical, exposed to the coal price but underpinned by a fortress balance sheet and a durable competitive position.
UNTR is the exclusive Indonesian distributor for Komatsu, selling excavators, bulldozers and graders, then earning a longer and steadier margin on spare parts and service for the life of each machine. It guided to about 4,600 Komatsu units in 2025 against roughly 4,350 in 2024, on a 24% share of the Indonesian heavy-equipment market.
EconomicsConstruction Machinery was Rp36.6tn, 27.9% of FY2025 revenue. Note what that means: equipment is NOT the biggest segment, despite the company's name and reputation. The parts and service annuity inside it is the most cycle-resistant income UNTR has, because a machine already in the field needs parts whether or not anyone is buying new ones.
Through Pamapersada Nusantara and KPP Mining, UNTR is Indonesia's largest mining contractor, stripping overburden and hauling coal for mine owners on a paid-per-unit basis. The scale is easy to understate: PAMA moved 1,217 million bcm of overburden in FY2024, which is about 1.2 BILLION cubic metres, and produced roughly 148 million tons of coal for its clients.
EconomicsAt Rp54.1tn, 41.2% of FY2025 revenue, this is the LARGEST segment. Being paid per unit moved rather than per tonne sold is supposed to insulate PAMA from the coal price, and on volume it largely does. But contract rates get renegotiated when the customer's own economics deteriorate, which is why the segment still fell 7% in FY2025.
Through Tuah Turangga Agung, UNTR mines and sells its own coal, taking direct price exposure rather than a contracted fee. FY2025 own-coal sales rose 14% to 11.6 million tons, including 3.7 million tons of metallurgical coal, with total volume including third-party coal up 9% to 14.3 million tons.
EconomicsRp24.2tn, 18.4% of revenue, and down 7% despite selling 14% MORE of its own coal. That single comparison tells you the price fell faster than the volume grew, and it is the cleanest evidence on this page that FY2025 was a price problem rather than a demand problem.
UNTR acquired 95% of PT Agincourt Resources, which runs the Martabe gold mine in South Tapanuli, North Sumatra, in 2018, and has since added nickel through PT Stargate Pasific Resources in Southeast Sulawesi, which sold 1.1 million wet metric tonnes of nickel ore in the first half of 2025. Together these form the Gold and Other Mineral Mining segment.
EconomicsRp14.0tn and 10.7% of revenue, up from 4.0% in FY2023, and the only segment that grew in FY2025. This is the one part of UNTR whose earnings do not depend on the coal price, which makes it both the genuine diversifier and, as January 2026 showed, the part carrying the sharpest single-asset regulatory risk.
Cost structureCost of revenue was Rp101.6tn of Rp131.3tn in FY2025, or 77.4%, leaving a 22.6% gross margin against 28.1% in FY2022. Because revenue barely moved over those three years, that 5.5-point compression is almost entirely price and mix rather than volume or cost inflation. The interest line is trivial for a company this size, Rp1.3tn against Rp21.8tn of operating profit, giving 16.8 times cover even at the bottom of the cycle, and the group held net CASH of Rp7.7tn at end-FY2025.
Cash cycleOne of the shortest cycles in the roster and a big part of why this business generates cash in every condition. The cash conversion cycle ran 25.2 days in FY2021 and just 10.3 days in FY2025, because days payable of 105.3 nearly cover days inventory of 60.1 plus days receivable of 55.5 combined. In plain terms, UNTR's suppliers fund most of its working capital, so growth does not consume cash the way it does at the property and landbank names.
Unit economicsHere is the test that matters for UNTR, and it is different from asking whether the company is good. Count the segments and it looks diversified: equipment, contracting, coal, gold and minerals, construction. Now ask whether they move together. In FY2025 Mining Contracting fell 7%, Construction Machinery fell 2% and Coal Mining fell 7%, while Gold and Other Mineral Mining rose 41%. In FY2024 the same split appeared: contracting up 8%, machinery up 2%, coal DOWN 15%, gold and minerals UP 90%. Three of the segments are the same bet expressed three ways, because UNTR sells machines to coal miners, then mines for coal miners, then mines coal itself. Rp54.1tn plus Rp24.2tn is 59.6% of revenue directly tied to coal, and a substantial part of the equipment segment sells into those same customers, so the true coal-linked share is higher again. Only the fourth segment is genuinely uncorrelated, and it has gone from 4.0% to 10.7% of revenue in two years. That is the whole investment question in one sentence: UNTR is not four bets, it is one big bet plus one small and rapidly growing different one.
Komatsu Japan is UNTR's sole heavy-equipment supplier: the exclusive distribution agreement is the foundation of the business but creates total dependence on one OEM. Komatsu sets pricing, product availability and dealer terms.
Implication → Renewal and terms of the exclusive Komatsu dealership are a critical variable, but this relationship has been maintained for decades and is mutually beneficial, making termination unlikely. Margin structure is partly set by OEM terms.
Large mining companies (Adaro, Bayan, Berau) are major buyers and can negotiate volume discounts; but for Komatsu equipment specifically, UNTR is the only legal source in Indonesia.
Implication → On equipment: limited buyer power (only one Komatsu dealer). On parts/service: captive demand from installed Komatsu fleet; switching to a non-Komatsu supplier would void warranties and is impractical.
The exclusive Komatsu dealership for Indonesia is a legal barrier to entry: no competitor can distribute Komatsu equipment. Competing OEMs (Caterpillar/Trakindo, Hitachi, Doosan) have their own exclusive dealers; UNTR does not face OEM-level entry risk on Komatsu products.
Implication → The Komatsu franchise creates a durable competitive moat for the heavy-equipment segment; the mining contracting and own-mining segments face more competition but PAMA's scale (about 1.2 BILLION bcm of overburden a year, 1,217 million bcm in FY2024) is itself a barrier.
Competing OEM brands (Caterpillar, Hitachi, Doosan, Volvo) are direct substitutes for new equipment purchases; customers can choose a non-Komatsu machine for new projects. Chinese OEMs (XCMG, SANY) are emerging substitutes at lower price points.
Implication → Equipment sales face OEM substitution; but for the large installed Komatsu fleet, parts/service are nearly captive. Chinese OEM price competition is a rising medium-term risk for market share.
Heavy equipment market: UNTR (Komatsu) competes with Trakindo (Caterpillar), Hitachi, Doosan and Chinese OEM dealers. Mining contracting: PAMA competes with Thiess, Leighton (CIPTA) and domestic contractors.
Implication → UNTR is market leader in Indonesian heavy equipment; rivalry is real but the Komatsu brand premium and PAMA's scale keep UNTR in the #1 position. Chinese OEM entry is the key structural threat to watch.
After several names on this site where reported profit was an accounting event, UNTR is the opposite case and worth reading as a control sample. The five-year record carries no material accounting one-offs, and the cash backs the profit in every single year: operating cash flow covered net income 2.27, 1.57, 1.28, 1.54 and 1.83 times across FY2021 to FY2025. Free cash flow was POSITIVE in all five years, totalling about Rp81.8tn, and that includes FY2023 when capital spending peaked at Rp18.8tn. The engine's tax factor sits between 0.71 and 0.76 throughout, comfortably below 1, so none of the returns on this page rely on non-operating income to look respectable. What the accounts do contain is a cyclical decline that is easy to misread. Net income fell from Rp21.0tn in FY2022 to Rp14.8tn in FY2025, a 29.5% drop, while revenue over the same period ROSE from Rp123.6tn to Rp131.3tn. Volumes were not the problem: own-coal sales rose 14% in FY2025 and PAMA moved over a billion cubic metres of overburden. Prices and contract rates were the problem. Read the margin line, not the revenue line, to see this company's cycle. One genuine caution on comparability sits outside the FY2025 accounts entirely: the Martabe permit revocation and reinstatement happened in the first quarter of 2026, so it touches none of the figures on this page while mattering a great deal to what comes next.
| Period | One-off item | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| FY2026 | Subsequent event: Martabe gold mine permit revoked, then reinstated | In January 2026 PT Agincourt Resources, 95% owned, was one of 28 companies whose permits were revoked over forest-use violations after the November 2025 northern Sumatra floods and landslides that killed at least 1,200 people. UNTR shares fell nearly 15%. The Environment Ministry sued for Rp200.99bn compensation plus Rp25.24bn of restoration. Sanctions were lifted in March 2026 and the mine restarted, per April 2026 reporting, under a compromise in which Agincourt pays for the environmental damage. Affects no FY2025 figure on this page; changes the risk profile of the segment that had been the growth story. |
Cash conversionThe strongest in the deep set. Operating cash flow exceeded net income in all five years, the weakest reading being 1.28 times in FY2023, and free cash flow was positive in all five even while capital spending ran between 3.8% and 14.6% of revenue. Cumulative free cash flow of roughly Rp81.8tn over five years against cumulative net income of about Rp86.2tn is close to one-for-one, which is what a healthy industrial should look like and is worth remembering as the benchmark when reading the weaker names on this site.
UNTR does something few companies on this site manage: it invests heavily and still hands cash back, because the cash flow is large enough to do both. Capital spending rose from Rp3.0tn in FY2021 to Rp18.8tn in FY2023 and Rp13.7tn in FY2025, it bought into nickel for about Rp4.27tn, and it still finished FY2025 with net CASH of Rp7.7tn and debt to equity of 0.18. That is the definition of a mixed allocator rather than a pure builder or harvester, and it is a position earned by the cash cycle described above rather than by financial engineering.
DeploymentThe direction of travel is clear once you line the spending up against the segments. Capital and acquisitions have gone disproportionately toward the non-coal businesses: the 2018 purchase of 95% of Agincourt, the nickel acquisitions at about Rp4.27tn, and the capex spike in FY2023 when total spending nearly tripled to Rp18.8tn. The result shows in the mix, with Gold and Other Mineral Mining going from 4.0% of revenue in FY2023 to 7.4% and then 10.7%. Debt was used sparingly and temporarily: total borrowings went from Rp3.0tn in FY2022 to Rp18.9tn in FY2023 to fund that investment, and net debt touched a small positive Rp0.3tn that year, the only year in the window the group was not in a net cash position. By FY2025 net cash was back at Rp7.7tn. So the diversification is being bought out of operating cash flow rather than out of leverage, which is the most favourable way it could be financed.
Returns trendReturns are cyclical around a genuinely high base: return on equity 15.0%, 24.8%, 26.0%, 21.0% and 15.1%, with return on invested capital tracking it almost exactly at 14.8%, 23.7%, 24.9%, 21.0% and 15.3%. Because the group is in a net cash position, invested capital is effectively just equity, so those two measures should and do converge. Even the trough year clears the cost of capital carried in this page's Valuation section, which is the test that separates a cyclical from a value trap. Now the interesting part, and it is a lesson in not trusting a single model. On price, UNTR looks extremely cheap: about 5.7 times FY2025 earnings, 0.86 times book so BELOW the value of its own equity, and an EV/EBITDA of 2.5 times against a heavy-equipment peer median of 12.4 times, a 80.2% discount. The forward discounted cash flow, on cyclically normalised assumptions, produces Rp55,037 per share against a market price of Rp23,971, implying the shares are worth about 2.3 times what they trade for. But run the model backwards and the picture is more sober: to justify today's price, free cash flow needs to decline only about 3.7% a year in perpetuity, whereas free cash flow actually declined about 9.8% a year over FY2021 to FY2025. In other words the market is NOT pricing in disaster. It is already assuming the decline moderates substantially from the recent trend, and the low multiple reflects a view about the coal cycle rather than a mispricing waiting to be collected. The two models disagree by a factor of well over two because they make opposite assumptions about whether the last three years were the new normal or the bottom. Both are outputs, neither is a target, and the honest position is that UNTR is cheap IF the coal-linked 60% of revenue stops shrinking.
Mining Contracting at Rp54.1tn plus Coal Mining at Rp24.2tn is 59.6% of FY2025 revenue directly tied to coal, and a substantial share of the Rp36.6tn equipment segment sells to those same mining customers, so the true exposure is higher. The correlation is visible in the data rather than inferred: in FY2025 those three segments fell 7%, 7% and 2% together while the one non-coal segment rose 41%, and FY2024 showed the same split. Counting segments is not the same as measuring diversification, and anyone treating UNTR as a diversified industrial is mismeasuring its single largest risk.
Gold and Other Mineral Mining is the only segment that grew, and in January 2026 the permit of its main asset was revoked. PT Agincourt Resources, 95% owned and operator of Martabe, was one of 28 companies stripped of permits for forest-use violations after the November 2025 northern Sumatra floods and landslides that killed at least 1,200 people; UNTR shares fell nearly 15%; the Environment Ministry sued for Rp200.99bn plus Rp25.24bn of restoration; and Danantara initially indicated the assets would pass to state-owned Perminas. Sanctions were lifted in March 2026 and the mine restarted. The outcome was benign but the mechanism is now demonstrated: a single-site asset in a sensitive catchment can be switched off by regulation faster than any commodity cycle moves, and the growth segment is the concentrated one.
Gross margin fell from 28.1% in FY2022 to 22.6% in FY2025 while revenue rose slightly from Rp123.6tn to Rp131.3tn, and net income fell 29.5% over the same span. Operating margin went 23.3% to 16.6%. Because volumes grew, own-coal sales up 14% in FY2025 and PAMA still moving over a billion cubic metres, the compression is price and contract rates rather than lost activity. Volume resilience is genuine comfort, but it also means there is no volume recovery left to fix the margin; that requires the coal price or renegotiated rates.
The exclusive Komatsu dealership is the foundation of the equipment segment and it is a genuine barrier, since no competitor may distribute Komatsu in Indonesia. But it is worth being precise about what it is not: Komatsu held a 24% share of the Indonesian heavy-equipment market on UNTR's own research, so this is market leadership in a contested market, not a monopoly on machines. Total dependence on a single OEM for pricing, product availability and dealer terms sits alongside rising Chinese competition from XCMG, SANY and Shantui at lower price points.
It is tempting to read 5.7 times earnings, 0.86 times book and 2.5 times EV/EBITDA against a 12.4 times peer median as an obvious bargain. Run the model backwards first. Today's price only requires free cash flow to decline about 3.7% a year in perpetuity, while free cash flow actually fell about 9.8% a year across FY2021 to FY2025. The market is therefore already assuming a marked improvement on the delivered trend, not pricing catastrophe. The forward model's Rp55,037 per share depends on cyclically normalised margins returning; if the last three years are the new normal rather than a trough, the current multiple is not cheap at all.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's heavy equipment market is dominated by mining (coal, nickel, gold): which drives ~70 % of unit demand. UNTR (United Tractors) controls ~50 % of the market through Komatsu distribution, PAMA mining contracting, and Martabe gold mining. Chinese brands (SANY 22 %) are rapidly eroding the Japanese OEM premium.