Equal · Financial Report

Adi Sarana Armada

ASSA/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-06-20

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burden	0.62x	19.65x	1.84x	0.59x	0.58x
Interest burden	0.49x	0.02x	0.17x	0.58x	0.71x
Operating margindriver	9.1%	4.6%	7.4%	14.2%	17.0%
Asset turnover	0.84x	0.81x	0.61x	0.64x	0.71x
Leverage (equity mult.)	3.42x	2.94x	2.82x	2.78x	2.65x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	8.1%	4.2%	4.0%	8.8%	13.1%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	5.9%	4.8%	5.7%	6.7%	9.2%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	0.90x	0.86x	0.88x	0.84x	0.99x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	0.87x	0.83x	0.84x	0.80x	0.95x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.38x	0.52x	0.46x	0.34x	0.53x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	-Rp 121 M	-Rp 247 M	-Rp 197 M	-Rp 280 M	-Rp 23 M

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	2.03x	1.64x	1.52x	1.47x	1.34x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	2.42x	1.94x	1.82x	1.78x	1.65x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.59x	0.56x	0.54x	0.53x	0.51x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	Rp 3.1 T	Rp 3.1 T	Rp 3.2 T	Rp 3.5 T	Rp 3.2 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	1.98x	1.02x	1.21x	2.40x	3.47x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	3.42x	2.94x	2.82x	2.78x	2.65x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	22.5%	19.9%	27.7%	32.6%	33.7%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	9.1%	4.6%	7.4%	14.2%	17.0%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	2.8%	1.8%	2.3%	4.9%	7.0%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 984 M	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.8 T
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	21.0%	16.8%	24.7%	30.3%	30.8%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	2.4%	1.4%	1.4%	3.2%	4.9%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	9.4%	6.4%	5.6%	12.5%	19.1%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	0.62x	19.65x	1.84x	0.59x	0.58x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.49x	0.02x	0.17x	0.58x	0.71x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	5.9%	4.8%	5.7%	6.7%	9.2%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.84x	0.81x	0.61x	0.64x	0.71x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	125.13x	81.74x	50.70x	52.02x	57.03x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	9.51x	12.36x	10.18x	8.29x	8.13x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	38.38x	48.74x	52.99x	83.37x	49.42x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	2.9 days	4.5 days	7.2 days	7.0 days	6.4 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	38.4 days	29.5 days	35.9 days	44.0 days	44.9 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	9.5 days	7.5 days	6.9 days	4.4 days	7.4 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	31.8 days	26.5 days	36.2 days	46.7 days	43.9 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 15 M	-Rp 344 M	Rp 290 M	Rp 325 M	Rp 808 M

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 610 · market cap Rp 2.3 T

Multiple	ASSA	Peer median	vs median
P/E	5.39x	9.58x	-44%
P/B	1.03x	1.57x	-35%
P/S	0.38x	0.98x	-62%
EV/EBITDA	3.50x	6.23x	-44%
EV/EBIT	6.32x	8.90x	-29%
EV/Sales	1.08x	1.49x	-28%
FCF Yield	35.93%	19.11%	+88%
Dividend Yield	8.20%	3.84%(3/4)	+114%

EV = mkt cap Rp 2.3 T + debt Rp 4.3 T − cash Rp 1.1 T + minority interest Rp 1.0 T = Rp 6.4 T

What the price implies

At today’s price, the market is paying for 0.7%/yr FCF growth (-2.0% at 12.0% to 3.3% at 16.0% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: 171.4% FCF · 4.2% revenue.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.68 → 1.52	Transportation (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.90
Cost of equity	17.44%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	10.01%	median interest coverage 2.0x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a B1/B+ synthetic rating and a 2.75% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 6.9%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	35.0%	median effective rate FY2021–FY2025 computed to 40.6%, CLAMPED to 35%: above that ceiling the pretax approximation is carrying minority interests, which are already deducted separately from enterprise value, rather than tax
WACC	10.27%	34% E × CoE + 66% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	4.2%	delivered 4-yr revenue CAGR 4.2%, fading linearly to terminal
EBIT margin	12.9%	mean EBIT margin, last 3 FYs
D&A / revenue	15.7%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	5.2%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 10.3% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 24.3% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 17.6% of revenue against depreciation of 15.7%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	4.9%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs4.2%

EBIT margin12.9%

WACC10.3%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue5.2%

D&A

% of revenue15.7%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue4.9%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	4.2%	3.7%	3.3%	2.9%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 6.2 T	Rp 6.5 T	Rp 6.7 T	Rp 6.9 T	Rp 7.1 T	Rp 7.2 T
EBIT	Rp 804 M	Rp 834 M	Rp 862 M	Rp 887 M	Rp 909 M	Rp 932 M
NOPAT	Rp 522 M	Rp 542 M	Rp 560 M	Rp 576 M	Rp 591 M	Rp 606 M
+ D&A	Rp 981 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.1 T
− Capex	Rp 324 M	Rp 336 M	Rp 347 M	Rp 357 M	Rp 366 M	Rp 1.3 T
− ΔNWC	Rp 12 M	Rp 12 M	Rp 11 M	Rp 9.6 M	Rp 8.5 M	Rp 8.7 M
FCFF	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 458 M
PV	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 997 M	Rp 935 M	Rp 874 M	Rp 813 M	Rp 3.6 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 4.7 T + PV(TV) Rp 3.6 T = Rp 8.3 T · TV 44% of EV · − net debt Rp 3.2 T − minority Rp 1.0 T = equity Rp 4.1 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp 1,110/share (+82% vs price Rp 610)· exit-multiple check (6.2x): Rp 2,219

Under these assumptions the model lands 82% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	9.3%	10.3%	11.3%
2.0%	1,240	1,034	868
2.5%	1,341	1,110	928
3.0%	1,457	1,196	994

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

GDP/consumption ↑(M)Oil ↑(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 5.1 T	Rp 5.9 T	Rp 4.4 T	Rp 5.0 T	Rp 6.0 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 3.9 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 3.2 T	Rp 3.3 T	Rp 4.0 T
Gross Profit	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 2.0 T
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 463 M	Rp 270 M	Rp 329 M	Rp 705 M	Rp 1.0 T
Interest Expense	Rp 234 M	Rp 264 M	Rp 272 M	Rp 294 M	Rp 294 M
Net Income	Rp 143 M	Rp 103 M	Rp 104 M	Rp 244 M	Rp 418 M
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 143 M	Rp 103 M	Rp 104 M	Rp 244 M	Rp 418 M
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 607 M	Rp 714 M	Rp 768 M	Rp 799 M	Rp 823 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 447 M	Rp 932 M	Rp 760 M	Rp 593 M	Rp 1.1 T
Accounts Receivable	Rp 535 M	Rp 475 M	Rp 436 M	Rp 598 M	Rp 737 M
Inventory	Rp 32 M	Rp 58 M	Rp 63 M	Rp 64 M	Rp 70 M
Current Assets	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 2.0 T
Total Assets	Rp 6.0 T	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 7.3 T	Rp 7.7 T	Rp 8.5 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 103 M	Rp 96 M	Rp 61 M	Rp 40 M	Rp 80 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 1.7 T	Rp 2.0 T
Total Liabilities	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 4.9 T	Rp 5.3 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 3.6 T	Rp 4.1 T	Rp 3.9 T	Rp 4.1 T	Rp 4.3 T
Total Equity	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 2.6 T	Rp 2.8 T	Rp 3.2 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 2.0 T	Rp 2.2 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 108 M	-Rp 146 M	Rp 482 M	Rp 748 M	Rp 971 M
Capital Expenditure	Rp 93 M	Rp 198 M	Rp 192 M	Rp 423 M	Rp 162 M

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-06-28

Analyst Verdict

Adi Sarana Armada is transforming from a pure corporate-fleet-leasing company into a three-pillar logistics ecosystem: Fleet Services (long-term corporate vehicle leasing, cars and commercial vehicles, with driver outsourcing); Anteraja (a last-mile courier and delivery service built for e-commerce logistics); and IBID/CarsPicker (a used-car auction marketplace). The FY24–25 inflection is striking: OPM rose from 4.6% (FY22, in the post-COVID normalisation squeeze) to 17.0% (FY25), and ROE from 6.4% to 19.1%, driven by Anteraja scaling and improving fleet margins. EBITDA margins (16–31%) run well above net margins (1.8–7%) because the fleet business carries heavy depreciation on its vehicle portfolio. D/E is elevated (1.34–2.03) but falling, which is inherent to a debt-financed vehicle fleet. FCF is improving (Rp808bn in FY25 against near-zero in FY22–23) though still small in absolute terms. This is a small-cap in a genuine operational inflection, and the thing to watch is whether Anteraja can hold onto profitability as the e-commerce courier market matures.

Business Model

ASSA operates three businesses. (1) Fleet Services: long-term leasing of corporate vehicles (passenger cars, vans, commercial vehicles) to companies, including driver outsourcing (managed service model); the traditional revenue base, capital-intensive, recurring revenue. (2) Anteraja: last-mile courier and logistics company serving e-commerce shipments; asset-light model, competing with J&T, SiCepat, JNE in Indonesia's growing parcel market. (3) IBID/CarsPicker: online used-car auction platform connecting dealers and retail buyers; marketplace model, asset-light. The three pillars share transportation/vehicle expertise but have distinct economics.

Segments

Fleet leasing (the revenue anchor, high EBITDA, heavy depreciation → thin NM) and Anteraja logistics (fast-growing, lower capex, courier margin improving rapidly). The EBITDA-to-NM gap (EBITDA 21–31% vs NM 1.8–7%) reflects vehicle depreciation (fleet companies depreciate hundreds of cars simultaneously) + interest cost on fleet debt. GM improved dramatically from 19.9% (FY22) to 33.7% (FY25) as Anteraja mix and fleet pricing improved.

Value Chain & Positioning

Fleet: vehicle procurement (from Astra, Toyota, Mitsubishi) → fleet deployment to corporate clients → monthly lease income + driver service fee → end-of-life vehicle disposal/auction. Anteraja: pickup from e-commerce sellers → sortation hub → last-mile delivery → cash-on-delivery handling → remittance. IBID: auction listing → dealer bidding → transaction facilitation → settlement. The integration allows used fleet vehicles to flow into IBID auctions at end of lease: a synergy between fleet and marketplace.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerMedium

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

Vehicle procurement from Toyota, Daihatsu, Mitsubishi (concentrated OEM suppliers); fuel costs for fleet operations; Anteraja's courier capacity depends on motorcycle procurement and driver networks.

Implication → OEM vehicle prices and fuel costs are the primary input cost drivers; ASSA has limited pricing power over OEM suppliers but benefits from volume discounts on large fleet orders.

Buyer powerMedium

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Corporate fleet clients (medium-to-large enterprises) can negotiate multi-year lease rates; Anteraja shippers (e-commerce platforms, SMEs) have multiple courier alternatives (J&T, SiCepat, JNE). IBID buyers and sellers are fragmented.

Implication → Fleet business has medium buyer power: long-term contracts lock in rates, but large clients have leverage on renewal pricing. Anteraja faces intense price competition from well-funded courier rivals.

Threat of new entryMedium

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Fleet leasing requires capital (vehicle fleet) and corporate relationships: moderate barriers. Last-mile courier (Anteraja's space) has low physical barriers but high capital requirements to scale sorting infrastructure; well-funded entrants (J&T Express, backed by Chinese capital) have already entered.

Implication → Fleet moat is reasonable (capital + relationships); Anteraja faces an intensely competitive courier market where scale (package volume) is the main determinant of unit economics.

Threat of substitutesMedium

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

Ride-hailing (Gojek, Grab) substitutes corporate car rental for some use cases; digital logistics aggregators substitute dedicated courier relationships; peer-to-peer car sharing substitutes fleet for short-term needs.

Implication → Long-term fleet contracts are relatively substitution-resistant; Anteraja faces highest substitution risk (shippers can and do switch courier providers based on price/speed/coverage).

Competitive rivalryHigh

Intensity of competition among existing players.

Courier/last-mile: J&T Express, SiCepat, JNE, Ninja Express; well-funded, price-competitive. Fleet leasing: Orix Indonesia, Astra Fleet Management, established competitors. Used-car auction: Moladin, OLX Autos, digital natives.

Implication → High rivalry in both core verticals: fleet (margin pressure on renewal) and courier (price/volume race). The FY24–25 OPM improvement (4.6%→17.0%) suggests ASSA is finding differentiation, but maintaining it against well-capitalized rivals is the key test.

Moat / Competitive Edge

Narrow. ASSA's moat in fleet leasing is its corporate client relationships and managed-service depth (driver outsourcing adds stickiness beyond the vehicle itself). Anteraja's moat is thin: last-mile courier is scale-driven and ASSA competes against larger, better-funded rivals. IBID's used-car auction marketplace is an early-stage platform with growing transaction volume. The FY24–25 inflection (ROE 6%→19%) is operationally real but the durability of Anteraja's margins in a price-competitive market is unproven at full scale. Balance-sheet risk: D/E 1.34 with IC only 3.5× leaves limited buffer; sustained EBITDA growth is necessary.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Anteraja volume growth (e-commerce parcel demand)
Anteraja's parcel volume directly tracks Indonesian e-commerce GMV growth (~20–30% p.a. in recent years). Higher volume → lower unit costs → margin expansion. The OPM swing from 4.6% (FY22) to 17.0% (FY25) was largely driven by Anteraja achieving operational scale.
Fleet utilisation rate and lease pricing
Fleet revenue = number of vehicles × utilisation rate × monthly lease rate. Improving lease rates (mix shift to higher-yield contracts) contributed to the FY24–25 GM improvement (from 19.9% to 33.7%). Each percentage point of utilisation change shifts fleet revenue ~1–2%.
Interest coverage / D/E deleveraging
IC improved from a dangerous 1.02× (FY22) to 3.47× (FY25) as EBITDA grew and debt was partly reduced. D/E declining 2.03→1.34 reduces interest costs and improves FCF. This is the critical financial resilience metric: ASSA cannot afford another FY22-style margin squeeze.
Courier market pricing war intensity
If J&T, SiCepat or JNE accelerate price-cutting to gain market share, Anteraja faces margin compression. The FY22 squeeze (OPM 4.6%) partly reflected this; the FY25 recovery (OPM 17%) may reflect market rationalization, but this dynamic is ongoing.
IBID used-car auction platform GMV
IBID/CarsPicker captures value from the growing Indonesian used-car market (5–7M vehicles/year in transactions); growing GMV → growing commission revenue → higher-margin contribution from the asset-light marketplace model.

Linkages

Linked to Indonesian e-commerce GMV growth (Anteraja), corporate vehicle fleet demand (corporate capex and business activity), BI rate (fleet financing cost: high D/E means rate sensitivity), and used-car market liquidity (IBID). Key risk: Anteraja's competitive position in a consolidating courier market. As a small-cap, ASSA's liquidity and capital-raising ability are constrained vs listed courier peers.

Recent Developments

FY21–25: dramatic inflection from operational trough (FY22: OPM 4.6%, ROE 6.4%, IC 1.02×) to strong recovery (FY25: OPM 17.0%, ROE 19.1%, IC 3.47×, EBITDA 30.8%). GM expanded from 19.9% (FY22) to 33.7% (FY25): driven by Anteraja scaling and fleet mix improvement. FCF grew from near-zero (FY22–23) to Rp808bn (FY25). D/E declining 2.03→1.34. ROIC climbed with the recovery: 5.9% → 4.8% → 5.7% → 6.7% → 9.2%.

Regulation

Fleet leasing: vehicle financing regulations (OJK for leasing companies), driver labour laws (minimum wage, BPJS Ketenagakerjaan for outsourced drivers). Courier/logistics: Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo) for courier licensing, postal law, BPJS obligations for delivery personnel. Used-car auction: Ministry of Trade (auction house licensing). All subject to Indonesian labour law (employment contracts for drivers and couriers are a regulatory watch item given gig economy classification debates). Listed on IDX.

ESG & Sustainability

Material issues: gig worker status (Anteraja delivery personnel; classification as employees vs contractors affects BPJS obligations and minimum wage); fleet vehicle emissions (transition to EV fleet is a medium-term cost/brand issue); road safety (driver-outsourcing clients expect low accident rates). Governance: founding family retains significant ownership; professional management for day-to-day operations. The Anteraja model generates millions of delivery events: tracking emissions, worker welfare and road-safety outcomes is material.

Risks

Anteraja courier pricing war: margin compression if J&T/SiCepat intensify discounting
High D/E (1.34) with IC 3.47×: limited buffer if EBITDA regresses; FY22 IC of 1.02× showed near-distress risk
Corporate fleet demand softening with economic slowdown or corporate capex cuts
Gig-worker regulatory reclassification increasing BPJS and labour cost obligations
IBID used-car platform needing continued investment to compete with Moladin and OLX Autos

Outlook & What to Watch

A genuine operational inflection story (OPM 4.6%→17.0%, ROE 6%→19% over FY22→FY25), driven by Anteraja reaching operational scale and fleet margin improvement. The key test: sustaining 17% OPM against intense courier competition and growing FCF above the current Rp808bn level. D/E deleveraging to below 1.0× would materially de-risk the balance sheet. The IBID platform optionality is not yet significant in the P&L but could be a multi-year value creator. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

EBITDA Margin: 30.8% (FY25): cash-earning power before depreciation + interest
OPM: 17.0% (FY25) vs 4.6% (FY22): operational inflection
Interest Coverage: 3.47× (FY25) vs 1.02× (FY22): financial resilience improving
D/E: 1.34 (FY25, declining from 2.03): fleet debt reducing
Anteraja Volume: Parcel delivery count: the key Anteraja scale metric

Sources

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.