Equal
…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burden | 0.69x | 0.65x | 0.78x | 0.72x | 0.80x |
| Interest burden | 0.93x | 0.96x | 0.81x | 0.73x | 0.70x |
| Operating margindriver | 21.5% | 29.6% | 15.3% | 13.1% | 11.7% |
| Asset turnover | 0.81x | 1.00x | 0.61x | 0.57x | 0.56x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 2.17x | 1.78x | 1.83x | 1.77x | 1.84x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 24.4% | 32.9% | 10.9% | 7.0% | 6.7% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 23.2% | 34.2% | 13.0% | 8.7% | 7.9% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.45x | 2.04x | 2.40x | 2.72x | 2.16x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 1.44x | 2.03x | 2.39x | 2.70x | 2.14x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.79x | 1.31x | 1.58x | 1.48x | 1.10x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | $ 133 M | $ 333 M | $ 344 M | $ 386 M | $ 335 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 0.75x | 0.47x | 0.60x | 0.56x | 0.63x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.17x | 0.78x | 0.83x | 0.77x | 0.84x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.34x | 0.26x | 0.33x | 0.31x | 0.34x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | $ 50 M | -$ 113 M | $ 23 M | $ 71 M | $ 168 M |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 13.96x | 25.64x | 5.28x | 3.70x | 3.29x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.17x | 1.78x | 1.83x | 1.77x | 1.84x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 28.1% | 34.2% | 21.7% | 20.3% | 18.4% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 21.5% | 29.6% | 15.3% | 13.1% | 11.7% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 13.8% | 18.5% | 9.7% | 6.9% | 6.5% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | $ 162 M | $ 359 M | $ 146 M | $ 129 M | $ 131 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 24.1% | 31.2% | 18.8% | 17.4% | 16.4% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 11.2% | 18.4% | 5.9% | 3.9% | 3.6% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 35.2% | 48.0% | 15.4% | 9.9% | 9.5% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 0.69x | 0.65x | 0.78x | 0.72x | 0.80x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.93x | 0.96x | 0.81x | 0.73x | 0.70x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 23.2% | 34.2% | 13.0% | 8.7% | 7.9% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.81x | 1.00x | 0.61x | 0.57x | 0.56x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 164.55x | 221.40x | 190.22x | 135.46x | 132.58x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 4.21x | 6.07x | 6.25x | 5.74x | 5.63x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 8.16x | 11.60x | 11.09x | 10.87x | 11.85x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 2.2 days | 1.6 days | 1.9 days | 2.7 days | 2.8 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 86.8 days | 60.1 days | 58.4 days | 63.5 days | 64.8 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 44.7 days | 31.5 days | 32.9 days | 33.6 days | 30.8 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 44.3 days | 30.3 days | 27.4 days | 32.6 days | 36.8 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | $ 132 M | $ 355 M | $ 97 M | $ 49 M | $ 70 M |
Price Rp 300 · market cap Rp 4.9 T ($ 272 M at the cited rate; statements are filed in USD)
| Multiple | SMDR | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 5.22x | 9.58x | -45% |
| P/B | 0.50x | 1.57x | -68% |
| P/S | 0.34x | 0.98x | -65% |
| EV/EBITDA | 5.07x | 6.23x | -19% |
| EV/EBIT | 7.12x | 8.90x | -20% |
| EV/Sales | 0.83x | 1.49x | -44% |
| FCF Yield | 25.75% | 19.11% | +35% |
| Dividend Yield | 3.84% | 3.84%(3/4) | 0% |
EV = mkt cap $ 272 M + debt $ 485 M − cash $ 318 M + minority interest $ 227 M = $ 667 M
At today’s price, the market is paying for -0.4%/yr FCF growth (-3.8% at 9.3% to 2.6% at 13.3% discount rates). Delivered over the last 4 years: -14.7% FCF · 4.5% revenue.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 9.3–13.3% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 4.66% | US 10Y Treasury, 10 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.68 → 1.55 | Transportation (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 1.79 |
| Cost of equity | 15.04% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 5.86% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 28.2% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 8.10% | 36% E × CoE + 64% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (4.5%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 18.2% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 4.2% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 14.3% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 4.2% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 9.8% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | $ 822 M | $ 842 M | $ 863 M | $ 885 M | $ 907 M | $ 930 M |
| EBIT | $ 150 M | $ 154 M | $ 157 M | $ 161 M | $ 165 M | $ 170 M |
| NOPAT | $ 108 M | $ 110 M | $ 113 M | $ 116 M | $ 119 M | $ 122 M |
| + D&A | $ 34 M | $ 35 M | $ 36 M | $ 37 M | $ 38 M | $ 39 M |
| − Capex | $ 118 M | $ 121 M | $ 124 M | $ 127 M | $ 130 M | $ 39 M |
| − ΔNWC | $ 2.0 M | $ 2.0 M | $ 2.1 M | $ 2.1 M | $ 2.2 M | $ 2.2 M |
| FCFF | $ 22 M | $ 23 M | $ 23 M | $ 24 M | $ 25 M | $ 120 M |
| PV | $ 21 M | $ 20 M | $ 19 M | $ 18 M | $ 17 M | $ 1.4 B |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) $ 93 M + PV(TV) $ 1.4 B = $ 1.5 B · TV 94% of EV · − net debt $ 168 M − minority $ 227 M
Model output: Rp 1,262/share (+321% vs price Rp 300)· exit-multiple check (6.2x): Rp 614
Under these assumptions the model lands 321% above today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for slower growth, a thinner margin, or a higher discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 7.1% | 8.1% | 9.1% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 1,480 | 1,112 | 850 |
| 2.5% | 1,704 | 1,262 | 957 |
| 3.0% | 1,983 | 1,442 | 1,081 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $ 673 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 772 M | $ 737 M | $ 802 M |
| Cost of Goods Sold | $ 484 M | $ 757 M | $ 605 M | $ 588 M | $ 655 M |
| Gross Profit | $ 189 M | $ 394 M | $ 168 M | $ 150 M | $ 147 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | $ 144 M | $ 341 M | $ 118 M | $ 97 M | $ 94 M |
| Interest Expense | $ 10 M | $ 13 M | $ 22 M | $ 26 M | $ 28 M |
| Net Income | $ 93 M | $ 213 M | $ 75 M | $ 51 M | $ 52 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | $ 93 M | $ 213 M | $ 75 M | $ 51 M | $ 52 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | $ 17 M | $ 19 M | $ 27 M | $ 32 M | $ 38 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $ 235 M | $ 417 M | $ 388 M | $ 333 M | $ 318 M |
| Accounts Receivable | $ 160 M | $ 190 M | $ 124 M | $ 128 M | $ 142 M |
| Inventory | $ 2.9 M | $ 3.4 M | $ 3.2 M | $ 4.3 M | $ 4.9 M |
| Current Assets | $ 429 M | $ 652 M | $ 590 M | $ 611 M | $ 624 M |
| Total Assets | $ 829 M | $ 1.2 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.3 B | $ 1.4 B |
| Accounts Payable | $ 59 M | $ 65 M | $ 55 M | $ 54 M | $ 55 M |
| Current Liabilities | $ 297 M | $ 319 M | $ 246 M | $ 225 M | $ 289 M |
| Total Liabilities | $ 447 M | $ 507 M | $ 571 M | $ 561 M | $ 653 M |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | $ 285 M | $ 304 M | $ 411 M | $ 405 M | $ 485 M |
| Total Equity | $ 382 M | $ 646 M | $ 686 M | $ 727 M | $ 773 M |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | $ 264 M | $ 443 M | $ 485 M | $ 515 M | $ 546 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $ 158 M | $ 460 M | $ 258 M | $ 137 M | $ 152 M |
| Capital Expenditure | $ 25 M | $ 104 M | $ 161 M | $ 88 M | $ 82 M |
SMDR (Samudera Indonesia) is an integrated container/bulk shipping company whose FY2021-2025 track record is dominated by one event; the 2022 global freight-rate supercycle (pandemic-driven container shortages and port congestion), not by anything specific to SMDR's own execution. Net income spiked to a $212.7M peak in 2022 (+128.7% YoY, net margin 18.5%), then collapsed as global rates normalized: $74.6M (2023), $50.7M (2024), a modest $52.1M recovery (2025); a 76% decline from peak to trough. EBIT margin tells the same story more starkly: 29.6% at the 2022 peak, down to 11.7% by 2025, still compressing even in 2025's revenue-recovery year (revenue +8.7% YoY, but EBIT itself fell). The counter-case, disclosed rather than smoothed over: total assets grew every year regardless (+72.0% cumulative, 2021-2025) and absolute debt nearly doubled ($284.6M→$485.5M); SMDR kept expanding capacity through the downturn rather than retrenching. This is not necessarily a red flag: equity grew even faster than debt (thanks largely to the 2022 windfall being retained), so the debt-to-equity ratio actually improved (0.745x→0.628x) even as absolute leverage rose; a real, disclosed nuance worth stating precisely rather than either "debt is rising" or "leverage improved" in isolation.
Vessels and containers acquired/leased; total assets grew 72.0% cumulatively 2021-2025.
EconomicsA fixed-cost-heavy asset base that earns extraordinary returns when freight rates spike and thin returns when they normalize.
Freight rates are set by the global supply/demand balance, not by SMDR: the 2022 supercycle and its unwind are the clearest evidence.
EconomicsThis step, external to SMDR's control, explains nearly all of the FY2021-2025 profit variance.
Vessel operations, port calls, cargo handling: bunker fuel is the dominant variable operating cost.
EconomicsFuel-price volatility is a real, uncontrollable margin variable layered on top of the rate cycle.
Cost structureVessel/fleet depreciation ($37.8M FY2025) and interest expense ($28.5M FY2025) are the two largest fixed cost lines below EBIT; bunker fuel is embedded in COGS and is the dominant variable cost, globally priced.
Cash cycleFreight collected largely on delivery/contract terms, redeployed into fleet capex and debt service. Capex has continued through the down-cycle (assets +72.0% cumulative) rather than being cut back, a real, deliberate expansion choice during a weak-margin period.
Shipyards and container-leasing companies set vessel/equipment costs; fuel (bunker) prices are a major, globally-set variable cost SMDR cannot control.
Implication → Fuel-price swings are a direct, uncontrollable margin variable layered on top of the freight-rate cycle.
Large shippers (commodity exporters, retailers) negotiate contract rates; spot-market cargo owners have full pricing transparency via freight indices: buyer power rises sharply whenever vessel capacity is not scarce.
Implication → The 2022 margin spike happened precisely because capacity WAS scarce (pandemic congestion): buyer power temporarily collapsed; its return since 2023 is the direct cause of margin normalization.
Vessel acquisition is capital-intensive and route/port relationships take years to build; new entrants cannot easily replicate an established network.
Implication → Entry barriers are real but did not prevent the industry-wide margin collapse: the threat here is cyclical (rate normalization), not competitive entry.
No practical substitute for sea freight on Indonesia's inter-island and international trade routes: air freight is cost-prohibitive for bulk/container volumes.
Implication → Demand for sea freight itself is structurally secure; the risk is entirely about rate/margin, not volume displacement.
Competes with domestic players (TMAS, Pelni) on inter-island routes and global carriers (Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Evergreen) on international routes: global carriers' capacity decisions directly set the rate environment SMDR must accept.
Implication → SMDR is a rate-taker on international routes; its domestic inter-island business (competing directly with TMAS) is where it has more pricing influence.
Real and fully explained by one macro driver: the global freight-rate cycle, not company-specific execution or accounting choices. No one-off items identified in the reviewed data; the entire FY2021-2025 profit swing (4.2x, peak to trough) tracks the well-documented pandemic-era shipping supercycle and its subsequent normalization.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionNot independently computed from the disclosed statement lines in this dataset: operating cash flow detail beyond the headline figures was not extracted this batch.
A genuine builder even through a down-cycle: total assets grew every single year 2021-2025 (+72.0% cumulative), funded by both retained earnings from the 2022 windfall and rising absolute debt; a real bet on capacity ahead of the next cycle upturn, not a retrenchment during the margin-compression years.
DeploymentCapital was deployed into fleet/asset expansion throughout the downturn rather than returned or held back: total debt grew 70.6% cumulatively (2021-2025) to help fund this, even as EBIT margin nearly halved over the same period.
Returns trendReturns have compressed sharply and consistently since the 2022 peak (net margin 18.5%→6.5%) even as the asset base kept growing: a real test of whether this capacity expansion pays off once the freight-rate cycle turns favorable again, or whether SMDR is over-building into a structurally weaker-margin era.
Total assets grew every year 2021-2025 (+72.0% cumulative) and debt grew 70.6% cumulatively even as EBIT margin nearly halved (29.6%→11.7%): a real, quantified divergence between capital deployment and returns. Not necessarily a poor decision (positions SMDR for the next rate upturn), but a genuine risk if the downturn persists longer than expected.
Checked precisely rather than asserted in one direction: absolute debt grew 70.6% (2021-2025), but debt-to-equity actually improved (0.745x→0.628x) because equity grew even faster on retained 2022 profits. Both facts are real and disclosed together rather than cherry-picked.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's logistics sector is a fragmented IDR 900 T+ market. The listed segment is narrow: ASSA dominates vehicle fleet management and used-car logistics, while unlisted JNE, J&T, and Sicepat dominate express parcel delivery. E-commerce is the sector's primary growth engine.