Equal · Financial Report

Pelayaran Tempuran Emas

TMAS/FY2021–FY2025/Educational Analysis/IDR/Data source · 2026-07-16

ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Tax burdendriver	1.74x	0.95x	0.91x	1.12x	0.89x
Interest burden	0.72x	0.93x	0.90x	0.88x	0.87x
Operating margin	16.4%	31.8%	22.0%	15.8%	14.9%
Asset turnover	0.83x	1.11x	1.06x	0.99x	0.82x
Leverage (equity mult.)	2.63x	1.98x	1.58x	1.54x	1.68x
= Return on Equity (consolidated)	45.1%	61.3%	30.3%	23.5%	15.8%
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	19.9%	59.9%	30.1%	20.2%	13.1%

Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.

Liquidity

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities)	1.14x	1.76x	2.22x	1.89x	1.35x
Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities)	1.03x	1.63x	1.98x	1.65x	1.14x
Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities)	0.68x	1.28x	1.39x	1.09x	0.63x
Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities)	Rp 141 M	Rp 770 M	Rp 773 M	Rp 548 M	Rp 262 M

Leverage & Solvency

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity)	1.24x	0.68x	0.45x	0.42x	0.54x
Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity)	1.63x	0.98x	0.58x	0.54x	0.68x
Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets)	0.47x	0.35x	0.29x	0.27x	0.32x
Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash)	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 233 M	Rp 292 M	Rp 526 M	Rp 1.2 T
Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense)	3.63x	13.66x	10.51x	8.06x	7.41x
Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity)	2.63x	1.98x	1.58x	1.54x	1.68x

Profitability

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue)	21.2%	36.0%	25.8%	20.7%	18.3%
Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue)	16.4%	31.8%	22.0%	15.8%	14.9%
Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue)	20.6%	28.0%	18.2%	15.5%	11.5%
EBITDA(EBIT + D&A)	Rp 773 M	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 992 M	Rp 965 M
EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue)	22.9%	37.3%	28.6%	22.8%	22.2%
Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets)	17.2%	31.0%	19.2%	15.3%	9.4%
Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners))	45.3%	62.5%	31.2%	24.5%	16.6%
Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax)	1.74x	0.95x	0.91x	1.12x	0.89x
Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT)	0.72x	0.93x	0.90x	0.88x	0.87x
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)	19.9%	59.9%	30.1%	20.2%	13.1%

Operations & Efficiency

Turnover	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets)	0.83x	1.11x	1.06x	0.99x	0.82x
Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory)	23.66x	23.53x	20.96x	23.02x	22.99x
Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables)	11.78x	15.42x	13.14x	16.80x	14.20x
Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables)	9.17x	15.48x	14.38x	12.88x	11.77x

Conversion Period	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS)	15.4 days	15.5 days	17.4 days	15.9 days	15.9 days
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue)	31.0 days	23.7 days	27.8 days	21.7 days	25.7 days
Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS)	39.8 days	23.6 days	25.4 days	28.3 days	31.0 days
Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO)	6.6 days	15.6 days	19.8 days	9.2 days	10.6 days

Cash Flow

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex)	Rp 205 M	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 683 M	-Rp 93 M	-Rp 566 M

Valuation

price as-of 2026-07-31fundamentals: FY2025

Price Rp 121 · market cap Rp 6.9 T

Multiple	TMAS	Peer median	vs median
P/E	13.78x	9.58x	+44%
P/B	2.28x	1.57x	+46%
P/S	1.58x	0.98x	+62%
EV/EBITDA	8.56x	6.23x	+37%
EV/EBIT	12.77x	8.90x	+43%
EV/Sales	1.90x	1.49x	+28%
FCF Yield	-8.23%	19.11%	-143%
Dividend Yield	3.31%	3.84%(3/4)	-14%

EV = mkt cap Rp 6.9 T + debt Rp 1.7 T − cash Rp 480 M + minority interest Rp 141 M = Rp 8.3 T

What the price implies

not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.

Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.

Forward DCF (glass-box)

This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.

Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.

Assumption	Value	Basis
Rf (risk-free)	7.26%	Indonesia 10Y government bond, re-verified 31 Jul 2026
ERP (Rm − Rf)	6.69%	Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%)
β	0.68 → 0.83	Transportation (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.25
Cost of equity	12.85%	Rf + β × ERP
Cost of debt	7.81%	median interest coverage 8.1x (EBIT ÷ interest, FY2021–FY2025) implies a Aa2/AA synthetic rating and a 0.55% default spread, over a 7.26% base (Indonesia 10Y 7.26%, already the sovereign rate). Its BOOK rate is 5.1%, which is what past debt actually costs; the gap is legacy or subsidised borrowing, not the rate on new debt. Spread table: A. Damodaran, Ratings, Interest Coverage Ratios and Default Spread, January 2026 data update (large non-financial service firms)
Tax rate	8.7%	median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest)
WACC	11.70%	80% E × CoE + 20% D × Kd × (1 − t)
Revenue growth (yr 1, fading)	2.5%	terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (6.6%) reflects cycle position, not a trend
EBIT margin	20.2%	full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption)
D&A / revenue	7.0%	mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs
Capex / revenue	22.5%	mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years. The terminal year instead FUNDS ITS OWN GROWTH: in stable growth g = reinvestment rate x return on capital, and returns are assumed to converge to the 11.7% cost of capital, so the perpetuity reinvests 21.4% of NOPAT and terminal capex is 10.8% of revenue against depreciation of 7.0%. Both simpler rules are wrong in opposite directions: holding the historical ratio charges a build phase in perpetuity, while setting capex equal to depreciation hands the company 2.5% growth forever for no new capital. Because returns converge to the cost of capital, terminal growth here is value-neutral
ΔNWC / Δrevenue	3.7%	median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP)
Terminal growth	2.5%	BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%)

Growth path

year 1 → fading to terminal over 5 yrs2.5%

EBIT margin20.2%

WACC11.7%

Terminal growth2.5%

Explicit years5

FCFF drivers

FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − capex − ΔNWC

Each default is the company's own historical average, which describes the phase it happened to be in. Switch a driver to Per-year when that phase is ending: a company mid-build does not spend at its peak rate forever, and one in a capex pause does not stay there. The terminal year keeps its own ratios, so a taper you enter here changes the explicit window and leaves the perpetuity coherent.

Capex

% of revenue22.5%

D&A

% of revenue7.0%

ΔNWC

% of the CHANGE in revenue3.7%

Year	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	T∞
Growth	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%	2.5%
Revenue	Rp 4.5 T	Rp 4.6 T	Rp 4.7 T	Rp 4.8 T	Rp 4.9 T	Rp 5.0 T
EBIT	Rp 899 M	Rp 921 M	Rp 945 M	Rp 968 M	Rp 992 M	Rp 1.0 T
NOPAT	Rp 821 M	Rp 841 M	Rp 862 M	Rp 884 M	Rp 906 M	Rp 928 M
+ D&A	Rp 311 M	Rp 319 M	Rp 327 M	Rp 335 M	Rp 343 M	Rp 352 M
− Capex	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 546 M
− ΔNWC	Rp 4.0 M	Rp 4.1 M	Rp 4.2 M	Rp 4.3 M	Rp 4.4 M	Rp 4.5 M
FCFF	Rp 126 M	Rp 129 M	Rp 133 M	Rp 136 M	Rp 139 M	Rp 730 M
PV	Rp 113 M	Rp 104 M	Rp 95 M	Rp 87 M	Rp 80 M	Rp 4.6 T

Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5 · equity = EV − net debt − minority · per share = equity ÷ shares outstanding

EV = PV(explicit) Rp 479 M + PV(TV) Rp 4.6 T = Rp 5.0 T · TV 90% of EV · − net debt Rp 1.2 T − minority Rp 141 M = equity Rp 3.7 T ÷ shares outstanding

Model output: Rp 64/share (-47% vs price Rp 121)· exit-multiple check (6.2x): Rp 68

Under these assumptions the model lands 47% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.

Sensitivity (per share, Rp)

g \ WACC	10.7%	11.7%	12.7%
2.0%	72	59	49
2.5%	79	64	53
3.0%	86	70	58

Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.

Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.

Macro backdropfull backdrop + sensitivity map →

BI Rate 5.75%IDR/USD 18,05810Y government bond yield 7.26%Inflation 3.34%(as-of 2026-07-31)

GDP/consumption ↑(M)Oil ↑(M)

Income Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Revenue	Rp 3.4 T	Rp 4.9 T	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 4.3 T	Rp 4.3 T
Cost of Goods Sold	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 3.1 T	Rp 3.2 T	Rp 3.4 T	Rp 3.6 T
Gross Profit	Rp 714 M	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 900 M	Rp 798 M
Operating Income (EBIT)	Rp 553 M	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 948 M	Rp 685 M	Rp 647 M
Interest Expense	Rp 152 M	Rp 114 M	Rp 90 M	Rp 85 M	Rp 87 M
Net Income	Rp 696 M	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 783 M	Rp 673 M	Rp 499 M
Net Income Attributable to Owners	Rp 696 M	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 783 M	Rp 673 M	Rp 499 M
Depreciation & Amortization	Rp 220 M	Rp 269 M	Rp 282 M	Rp 307 M	Rp 318 M

Balance Sheet

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Cash & Equivalents	Rp 682 M	Rp 1.3 T	Rp 883 M	Rp 671 M	Rp 480 M
Accounts Receivable	Rp 286 M	Rp 316 M	Rp 328 M	Rp 259 M	Rp 306 M
Inventory	Rp 112 M	Rp 133 M	Rp 152 M	Rp 150 M	Rp 154 M
Current Assets	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.8 T	Rp 1.4 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.0 T
Total Assets	Rp 4.1 T	Rp 4.4 T	Rp 4.1 T	Rp 4.4 T	Rp 5.3 T
Accounts Payable	Rp 290 M	Rp 202 M	Rp 222 M	Rp 267 M	Rp 302 M
Current Liabilities	Rp 997 M	Rp 1.0 T	Rp 635 M	Rp 614 M	Rp 758 M
Total Liabilities	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 2.1 T
Total Interest-Bearing Debt	Rp 1.9 T	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.2 T	Rp 1.7 T
Total Equity	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 2.6 T	Rp 2.9 T	Rp 3.2 T
Equity Attributable to Owners	Rp 1.5 T	Rp 2.2 T	Rp 2.5 T	Rp 2.7 T	Rp 3.0 T

Cash Flow Statement

	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025
Operating Cash Flow	Rp 709 M	Rp 1.6 T	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 992 M	Rp 829 M
Capital Expenditure	Rp 503 M	Rp 159 M	Rp 444 M	Rp 1.1 T	Rp 1.4 T

Company Deep Analysis

Reviewed: 2026-07-17

Analyst Verdict

TMAS (Pelayaran Tempuran Emas / Temas Line) is a domestic container shipping operator whose profit trajectory is a cleaner, more sustained decline than fellow-shipping name SMDR's boom-bust. Net income peaked at Rp1.36tn in 2022 (+96.2% YoY, the same pandemic-era freight-rate supercycle that drove SMDR's peak) and has fallen every single year since: Rp782.6bn (2023, -42.6%), Rp673.4bn (2024, -14.0%), Rp499.2bn (2025, -25.9%; the sharpest post-peak decline yet). What makes this a genuine margin story rather than a volume story: revenue has been essentially flat for three straight years (~Rp4.3tn, 2023-2025) while EBIT margin nearly halved (31.8% at the 2022 peak to 14.9% by 2025); costs are rising or pricing is softening on a stable volume base, not a shrinking one. The counter-case, disclosed precisely: leverage in RATIO terms improved dramatically (debt-to-equity 1.242x in 2021 to 0.545x in 2025, more than halved) as equity roughly doubled on retained profits, but 2025 alone saw a real, notable acceleration in both capex (assets +20.0% YoY) and absolute debt (+43.5% YoY), meaning TMAS pushed its biggest investment year of the window in the same year its profit fell fastest. Both facts are real and stated together, not resolved in either direction.

Business Model

A domestic (inter-island) container shipping operator, protected on its home routes by Indonesia's cabotage law (Law 17/2008: inter-island cargo must be carried by Indonesian-flagged vessels). Revenue depends on container volumes and freight rates on Indonesia's domestic trade lanes, funded by a fleet of owned and chartered vessels.

Operating Model (Business Process)

01Procure/charter fleet
Owned and chartered container vessels for domestic inter-island routes; assets grew 20.0% in FY2025 alone.
EconomicsA real, accelerating capital commitment made in the same year margins compressed fastest.
02Operate protected domestic routes
Cabotage law restricts inter-island cargo to Indonesian-flagged vessels: TMAS's core structural advantage.
EconomicsRevenue stability (flat ~Rp4.3tn) reflects this protection; margin compression reflects cost/pricing pressure within it.
03Absorb cost pressure
EBIT margin fell from 31.8% to 14.9% over 3 years on flat revenue: costs rose or pricing softened, not volume.
EconomicsThe central unresolved question behind 4 straight years of profit decline.

Cost structureDepreciation ($317.9bn Rp FY2025 in the raw data: a large, fixed fleet-ownership cost) and interest expense (Rp87.3bn FY2025, rising with the FY2025 debt jump) are the major cost lines below EBIT; bunker fuel embedded in COGS is the dominant variable cost.

Cash cycleFreight collected on delivery, redeployed into fleet capex (accelerating sharply in FY2025) and debt service (also rising). Operating cash flow (Rp829.2bn FY2025) comfortably covers capex on a standalone basis, though capex (Rp1.40tn FY2025) exceeded operating cash flow that year, requiring external financing.

Segments

FY2025: revenue Rp4.35tn (+0.1% YoY, essentially flat for a third straight year), EBIT Rp646.8bn (-5.5% YoY), net income Rp499.2bn (-25.9% YoY; the sharpest decline since the 2022 peak). Total assets Rp5.29tn (+20.0% YoY, the biggest single-year jump of the window), total debt Rp1.72tn (+43.5% YoY), total equity Rp3.15tn.

Value Chain & Positioning

Fleet procurement (owned + chartered container vessels) → domestic route scheduling (inter-island) → container freight booking → cargo handling at port → delivery. Cabotage protection means TMAS competes only with other Indonesian-flagged carriers (chiefly SMDR) on its home lanes, unlike SMDR's international routes which face global-carrier rate pressure directly.

Competitive Forces (Porter’s 5)

Supplier powerMedium

How much leverage input/funding providers have over pricing.

Shipbuilders/charter owners and bunker fuel suppliers set major input costs; fuel is globally priced and a real, uncontrollable variable.

Implication → Fuel-cost pressure is layered on top of the already-compressing freight-margin environment.

Buyer powerMedium

How much leverage customers have to push prices down.

Domestic shippers have fewer alternatives than international routes (cabotage limits carrier choice to Indonesian-flagged vessels), giving TMAS somewhat more pricing durability than SMDR's international business, but revenue has stayed flat regardless, suggesting real demand-side softness or rate discipline pressure even within the protected lane.

Implication → Cabotage protection has not prevented margin compression: the pressure is coming from cost inflation and/or rate softening within the protected market itself.

Threat of new entryLow

How easily new competitors can enter the market.

Cabotage law is a real, structural barrier: only Indonesian-flagged vessel operators can compete on domestic inter-island routes, a genuine regulatory moat.

Implication → Entry threat is genuinely low, which makes the sustained margin decline more notable: it is not being driven by new competition.

Threat of substitutesLow

Risk that alternative products/services replace demand.

No practical substitute for sea freight on Indonesia's inter-island archipelago routes.

Implication → Demand security is real; the margin story is entirely about cost/pricing, not volume displacement.

Competitive rivalryMedium

Intensity of competition among existing players.

Competes primarily with SMDR and Pelni on domestic inter-island routes: a smaller, more concentrated competitive set than SMDR's international exposure, protected by cabotage from foreign-carrier competition.

Implication → The margin decline is happening despite a relatively protected competitive position: worth watching whether it reflects rational domestic competition or broader cost inflation.

Moat / Competitive Edge

Medium. Cabotage law provides a genuine, durable regulatory barrier on TMAS's core domestic routes: real protection SMDR does not enjoy on its international lanes. But this moat has not prevented four straight years of profit decline; it protects market access, not margin, against the cost/pricing pressures at work within the protected lane itself.

Key Drivers & Sensitivities

Margin compression on flat volume
Revenue has been flat (~Rp4.3tn) for three straight years while net income fell every year (-42.6%, -14.0%, -25.9%): a sustained cost/pricing story, the central line to watch for this name.
Capex/debt acceleration
FY2025 saw assets grow 20.0% and debt grow 43.5% in one year: the largest single-year expansion of the window, deployed in the same year profit fell fastest; whether this investment reverses the margin trend or compounds the leverage risk is the key open question.
Cabotage policy stability
TMAS's core moat depends entirely on Indonesia's cabotage law remaining in force; any liberalization of domestic shipping to foreign-flagged carriers would be a structural threat.

Earnings Quality

Real, and the decline is genuinely sustained rather than a one-off reversion: net income fell for 4 consecutive years (2022-2025) on essentially flat revenue, pointing to a persistent cost or pricing issue rather than a single bad year. No one-off items identified in the reviewed data.

Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.

Cash conversionFY2025 operating cash flow (Rp829.2bn) exceeded net income (Rp499.2bn), a reasonable cash-conversion signal, but capex (Rp1.40tn) exceeded operating cash flow the same year, meaning the FY2025 investment push was partly externally financed.

Capital Allocation

Builder: reinvests above the cost of capital

A builder, and an accelerating one: FY2025 alone saw the largest single-year asset (+20.0%) and debt (+43.5%) expansion of the window, deployed in the same year profit fell fastest; a real, deliberate bet that capacity investment now will reverse the margin trend, made under real financial pressure.

DeploymentFY2025 capex (Rp1.40tn) exceeded operating cash flow (Rp829.2bn), requiring debt financing (+43.5% YoY): capital was deployed aggressively into fleet expansion despite the same year's profit decline being the steepest of the post-peak period.

Returns trendReturns have declined for 4 consecutive years (net margin 28.0%→11.5%, 2022-2025) even as the capital base grew: the clearest test case in this dataset for whether continued capex through a margin downturn eventually reverses it or simply compounds risk.

Linkages

Sits in this roster's new Bulk/Freight Shipping & Port Operations subsegment alongside SMDR (direct domestic competitor, also an international carrier) and PORT (a terminal operator TMAS vessels may call at). Domestic revenue links to Indonesia's inter-island trade volumes and consumption patterns rather than the global freight-rate cycle SMDR's international business is more exposed to: though both were hit by the same 2022 pandemic-era rate spike.

Recent Developments

FY2025: net income Rp499.2bn, down 25.9% YoY; the sharpest decline since the 2022 peak, even as revenue stayed essentially flat (+0.1%). Total assets grew 20.0% and debt grew 43.5% in the same year, the largest single-year expansion of the FY2021-2025 window: a real, notable acceleration in investment paired with the fastest profit decline of the period.

Regulation

Governed by Indonesia's cabotage principle (Law 17/2008 on Shipping): the core structural protection for TMAS's domestic business, restricting inter-island cargo carriage to Indonesian-flagged vessels. Subject to standard maritime safety and IMO emissions regulation on the operational side.

ESG & Sustainability

IMO emissions regulations are a real, material cost driver requiring fuel-type transitions or vessel retrofits over time, same as SMDR. Governance: standard IDX-listed disclosure. Social: seafarer safety and labor standards apply. No distinguishing exposure disclosed beyond standard shipping-industry factors in the sources reviewed.

Red-Flag Protocol

Four-year sustained margin declinewatch
Net income fell every year since the 2022 peak (Rp1.36tn→Rp499.2bn, -63% cumulative over 4 years) while revenue stayed essentially flat: a real, quantified, sustained cost or pricing problem, not a single bad year or a volume-driven decline.
FY2025 investment/decline coincidencewatch
The largest single-year capex and debt expansion of the FY2021-2025 window (+20.0%/+43.5%) landed in the exact same year as the sharpest profit decline (-25.9%); a real, quantified coincidence worth monitoring: either the investment is a response to the pressure (and may relieve it going forward) or it compounds the risk if margins keep falling.

Risks

Sustained margin compression: net income has fallen every year since the 2022 peak (4 straight years, -63% cumulative) despite flat revenue; a real, unresolved cost/pricing pressure, not a one-off.
FY2025 acceleration: the sharpest profit decline (-25.9%) of the post-peak period coincided with the largest capex/debt expansion (+20.0%/+43.5%); worth watching whether this investment pays off or compounds risk.
Cabotage-policy dependence: TMAS's core competitive protection rests entirely on Indonesia's cabotage law remaining unchanged; a real, if currently unrealized, regulatory risk.
Rising absolute debt: total debt grew 43.5% in FY2025 alone; the debt-to-equity ratio has improved on a multi-year view, but the pace of this year's increase is a real, recent data point worth tracking forward.
Fuel-cost exposure: bunker fuel is a major, globally-priced variable cost layered on top of the already-compressing domestic freight-margin environment.

Outlook & What to Watch

Two lines matter most: whether FY2025's large capex/debt push begins to reverse the four-year margin decline, or whether it simply adds leverage risk on top of an unresolved cost problem, and whether the flat-revenue pattern (three straight years near Rp4.3tn) breaks in either direction. (Interpretation, not a forecast.)

Key KPIs

Net Income: Rp499.2bn FY2025, -25.9% YoY: the sharpest decline since the 2022 peak (Rp1.36tn)
EBIT Margin: 14.9% FY2025, down from 31.8% at the 2022 peak: nearly halved over 3 years
Revenue: Rp4.35tn FY2025, essentially flat for a third straight year: the margin story is cost/pricing, not volume
Asset Growth: +20.0% FY2025: the largest single-year expansion of the FY2021-2025 window
Debt-to-Equity: 0.545x FY2025, improved from 1.242x (2021) on a multi-year view, despite a 43.5% single-year debt jump in FY2025

Sources

stockanalysis.com: PT Pelayaran Tempuran Emas Tbk (IDX:TMAS) Financials

Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.