…
…
ROE = tax × interest × margin × turnover × leverage
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax burdendriver | 1.74x | 0.95x | 0.91x | 1.12x | 0.89x |
| Interest burden | 0.72x | 0.93x | 0.90x | 0.88x | 0.87x |
| Operating margin | 16.4% | 31.8% | 22.0% | 15.8% | 14.9% |
| Asset turnover | 0.83x | 1.11x | 1.06x | 0.99x | 0.82x |
| Leverage (equity mult.) | 2.63x | 1.98x | 1.58x | 1.54x | 1.68x |
| = Return on Equity (consolidated) | 45.1% | 61.3% | 30.3% | 23.5% | 15.8% |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 19.9% | 59.9% | 30.1% | 20.2% | 13.1% |
Consolidated (pre-minority-interest) basis; the headline ROE in the ratio grid is owners’ basis.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio(Current Assets / Current Liabilities) | 1.14x | 1.76x | 2.22x | 1.89x | 1.35x |
| Quick Ratio((Current Assets − Inventory) / Current Liabilities) | 1.03x | 1.63x | 1.98x | 1.65x | 1.14x |
| Cash Ratio(Cash / Current Liabilities) | 0.68x | 1.28x | 1.39x | 1.09x | 0.63x |
| Working Capital(Current Assets − Current Liabilities) | Rp 141 M | Rp 770 M | Rp 773 M | Rp 548 M | Rp 262 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt to Equity (DER)(Total Debt / Total Equity) | 1.24x | 0.68x | 0.45x | 0.42x | 0.54x |
| Liabilities to Equity(Total Liabilities / Total Equity) | 1.63x | 0.98x | 0.58x | 0.54x | 0.68x |
| Debt to Assets(Total Debt / Total Assets) | 0.47x | 0.35x | 0.29x | 0.27x | 0.32x |
| Net Debt(Total Debt − Cash) | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 233 M | Rp 292 M | Rp 526 M | Rp 1.2 T |
| Interest Coverage(EBIT / Interest Expense) | 3.63x | 13.66x | 10.51x | 8.06x | 7.41x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) | 2.63x | 1.98x | 1.58x | 1.54x | 1.68x |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin(Gross Profit / Revenue) | 21.2% | 36.0% | 25.8% | 20.7% | 18.3% |
| Operating Margin(EBIT / Revenue) | 16.4% | 31.8% | 22.0% | 15.8% | 14.9% |
| Net Margin(Net Income / Revenue) | 20.6% | 28.0% | 18.2% | 15.5% | 11.5% |
| EBITDA(EBIT + D&A) | Rp 773 M | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 992 M | Rp 965 M |
| EBITDA Margin(EBITDA / Revenue) | 22.9% | 37.3% | 28.6% | 22.8% | 22.2% |
| Return on Assets (ROA)(Net Income / Total Assets) | 17.2% | 31.0% | 19.2% | 15.3% | 9.4% |
| Return on Equity (ROE)(Net Income (Owners) / Equity (Owners)) | 45.3% | 62.5% | 31.2% | 24.5% | 16.6% |
| Tax Burden (Net ÷ Pretax) | 1.74x | 0.95x | 0.91x | 1.12x | 0.89x |
| Interest Burden (Pretax ÷ EBIT) | 0.72x | 0.93x | 0.90x | 0.88x | 0.87x |
| Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) | 19.9% | 59.9% | 30.1% | 20.2% | 13.1% |
| Turnover | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Turnover(Revenue / Total Assets) | 0.83x | 1.11x | 1.06x | 0.99x | 0.82x |
| Inventory Turnover(COGS / Inventory) | 23.66x | 23.53x | 20.96x | 23.02x | 22.99x |
| Receivables Turnover(Revenue / Receivables) | 11.78x | 15.42x | 13.14x | 16.80x | 14.20x |
| Payables Turnover(COGS / Payables) | 9.17x | 15.48x | 14.38x | 12.88x | 11.77x |
| Conversion Period | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO)(365 × Inventory / COGS) | 15.4 days | 15.5 days | 17.4 days | 15.9 days | 15.9 days |
| Days Sales Outstanding (DSO)(365 × Receivables / Revenue) | 31.0 days | 23.7 days | 27.8 days | 21.7 days | 25.7 days |
| Days Payable Outstanding (DPO)(365 × Payables / COGS) | 39.8 days | 23.6 days | 25.4 days | 28.3 days | 31.0 days |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC)(DIO + DSO − DPO) | 6.6 days | 15.6 days | 19.8 days | 9.2 days | 10.6 days |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow(Operating Cash Flow − Capex) | Rp 205 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 683 M | -Rp 93 M | -Rp 566 M |
Price Rp 121 · market cap Rp 6.9 T
| Multiple | TMAS | Peer median | vs median |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E | 13.78x | 9.58x | +44% |
| P/B | 2.28x | 1.57x | +46% |
| P/S | 1.58x | 0.98x | +62% |
| EV/EBITDA | 8.56x | 6.23x | +37% |
| EV/EBIT | 12.77x | 8.90x | +43% |
| EV/Sales | 1.90x | 1.49x | +28% |
| FCF Yield | -8.23% | 19.11% | -143% |
| Dividend Yield | 3.31% | 3.84%(3/4) | -14% |
EV = mkt cap Rp 6.9 T + debt Rp 1.7 T − cash Rp 480 M + minority interest Rp 141 M = Rp 8.3 T
not computable: negative or zero base-year FCF. Shown as-is rather than estimated.
Reverse DCF: single-stage FCF, terminal growth 2.5%, discount band 12.0–16.0% (β=1; build cited in Methodology). Not a forecast.
This model projects the operating cash the whole business generates, discounts it back at the blended cost of capital, and subtracts net debt. What remains is the equity value, stated per share. Every input below comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and you can adjust each one yourself.
Cyclical normalization: Commodity/cyclical name: the trailing years are a sample drawn from the price cycle, not a trend. Defaults are therefore normalized, using the full-window mean margin with no cycle-position growth extrapolation. That normalized margin is itself the embedded commodity-price assumption.
| Assumption | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Rf (risk-free) | 7.26% | Indonesia 10Y government bond, 8 Jul 2026 |
| ERP (Rm − Rf) | 6.69% | Damodaran Indonesia, Jul 2026 (Baa2, CRP 2.46%) |
| β | 0.68 → 0.83 | Transportation (unlevered) relevered at own D/E 0.25 |
| Cost of equity | 12.85% | Rf + β × ERP |
| Cost of debt | 5.08% | FY2025 interest expense ÷ total debt |
| Tax rate | 8.7% | median effective rate, FY2021–FY2025 (pretax ≈ EBIT − interest) |
| WACC | 11.21% | 80% E × CoE + 20% D × Kd × (1 − t) |
| Revenue growth (yr 1, fading) | 2.5% | terminal growth from year 1, cyclical normalization: the delivered 4-yr CAGR (6.6%) reflects cycle position, not a trend |
| EBIT margin | 20.2% | full-cycle mean EBIT margin, FY2021–FY2025 (cyclical normalization: this margin is the embedded commodity-price assumption) |
| D&A / revenue | 7.0% | mean D&A/revenue, last 3 FYs |
| Capex / revenue | 22.5% | mean capex/revenue, last 3 FYs, for the explicit years; in the terminal year capex falls to replacement level (equal to depreciation, 7.0% of revenue) because holding a build-phase or pause-phase ratio in perpetuity misprices the company in whichever direction that phase points |
| ΔNWC / Δrevenue | 3.7% | median ΔNWC/Δrevenue across the seeded years (NWC = AR + inventory − AP) |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% | BI inflation-target midpoint (2.5% ± 1%) |
| Year | +1 | +2 | +3 | +4 | +5 | T∞ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% |
| Revenue | Rp 4.5 T | Rp 4.6 T | Rp 4.7 T | Rp 4.8 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 5.0 T |
| EBIT | Rp 899 M | Rp 921 M | Rp 945 M | Rp 968 M | Rp 992 M | Rp 1.0 T |
| NOPAT | Rp 821 M | Rp 841 M | Rp 862 M | Rp 884 M | Rp 906 M | Rp 928 M |
| + D&A | Rp 311 M | Rp 319 M | Rp 327 M | Rp 335 M | Rp 343 M | Rp 352 M |
| − Capex | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 352 M |
| − ΔNWC | Rp 4.0 M | Rp 4.1 M | Rp 4.2 M | Rp 4.3 M | Rp 4.4 M | Rp 4.5 M |
| FCFF | Rp 126 M | Rp 129 M | Rp 133 M | Rp 136 M | Rp 139 M | Rp 924 M |
| PV | Rp 114 M | Rp 105 M | Rp 96 M | Rp 89 M | Rp 82 M | Rp 6.2 T |
Check it yourself: revenue × margin = EBIT · NOPAT = EBIT × (1 − tax) · FCFF = NOPAT + D&A − Capex − ΔNWC · PV = FCFF ÷ (1+WACC)^yr · TV = FCFF(T∞) ÷ (WACC − g), discounted from year 5
EV = PV(explicit) Rp 486 M + PV(TV) Rp 6.2 T = Rp 6.7 T · TV 93% of EV · − net debt Rp 1.2 T − minority Rp 141 M
Model output: Rp 94/share (-22% vs price Rp 121)· exit-multiple check (6.2x): Rp 70
Under these assumptions the model lands 22% below today's price. The market, in other words, is paying for faster growth, a fatter margin, or a lower discount rate than the inputs here assume.
| g \ WACC | 10.2% | 11.2% | 12.2% |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0% | 104 | 86 | 72 |
| 2.5% | 114 | 94 | 78 |
| 3.0% | 125 | 103 | 85 |
Model output under the stated assumptions. Every input above comes from the company's own audited record or from cited market data, and every one can be adjusted. This is not a price target and not advice.
Educational analysis. Multiples pair today’s price with the latest audited fiscal year (trailing-FY convention); peer figures are the covered peer sample, not the whole market. Never a price target.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 4.9 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.3 T | Rp 4.3 T |
| Cost of Goods Sold | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.1 T | Rp 3.2 T | Rp 3.4 T | Rp 3.6 T |
| Gross Profit | Rp 714 M | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 900 M | Rp 798 M |
| Operating Income (EBIT) | Rp 553 M | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 948 M | Rp 685 M | Rp 647 M |
| Interest Expense | Rp 152 M | Rp 114 M | Rp 90 M | Rp 85 M | Rp 87 M |
| Net Income | Rp 696 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 783 M | Rp 673 M | Rp 499 M |
| Net Income Attributable to Owners | Rp 696 M | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 783 M | Rp 673 M | Rp 499 M |
| Depreciation & Amortization | Rp 220 M | Rp 269 M | Rp 282 M | Rp 307 M | Rp 318 M |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | Rp 682 M | Rp 1.3 T | Rp 883 M | Rp 671 M | Rp 480 M |
| Accounts Receivable | Rp 286 M | Rp 316 M | Rp 328 M | Rp 259 M | Rp 306 M |
| Inventory | Rp 112 M | Rp 133 M | Rp 152 M | Rp 150 M | Rp 154 M |
| Current Assets | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.8 T | Rp 1.4 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.0 T |
| Total Assets | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 4.1 T | Rp 4.4 T | Rp 5.3 T |
| Accounts Payable | Rp 290 M | Rp 202 M | Rp 222 M | Rp 267 M | Rp 302 M |
| Current Liabilities | Rp 997 M | Rp 1.0 T | Rp 635 M | Rp 614 M | Rp 758 M |
| Total Liabilities | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.1 T |
| Total Interest-Bearing Debt | Rp 1.9 T | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.2 T | Rp 1.7 T |
| Total Equity | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.6 T | Rp 2.9 T | Rp 3.2 T |
| Equity Attributable to Owners | Rp 1.5 T | Rp 2.2 T | Rp 2.5 T | Rp 2.7 T | Rp 3.0 T |
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | Rp 709 M | Rp 1.6 T | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 992 M | Rp 829 M |
| Capital Expenditure | Rp 503 M | Rp 159 M | Rp 444 M | Rp 1.1 T | Rp 1.4 T |
TMAS (Pelayaran Tempuran Emas / Temas Line) is a domestic container shipping operator whose profit trajectory is a cleaner, more sustained decline than fellow-shipping name SMDR's boom-bust. Net income peaked at Rp1.36tn in 2022 (+96.2% YoY, the same pandemic-era freight-rate supercycle that drove SMDR's peak) and has fallen every single year since: Rp782.6bn (2023, -42.6%), Rp673.4bn (2024, -14.0%), Rp499.2bn (2025, -25.9%; the sharpest post-peak decline yet). What makes this a genuine margin story rather than a volume story: revenue has been essentially flat for three straight years (~Rp4.3tn, 2023-2025) while EBIT margin nearly halved (31.8% at the 2022 peak to 14.9% by 2025); costs are rising or pricing is softening on a stable volume base, not a shrinking one. The counter-case, disclosed precisely: leverage in RATIO terms improved dramatically (debt-to-equity 1.242x in 2021 to 0.545x in 2025, more than halved) as equity roughly doubled on retained profits, but 2025 alone saw a real, notable acceleration in both capex (assets +20.0% YoY) and absolute debt (+43.5% YoY), meaning TMAS pushed its biggest investment year of the window in the same year its profit fell fastest. Both facts are real and stated together, not resolved in either direction.
Owned and chartered container vessels for domestic inter-island routes; assets grew 20.0% in FY2025 alone.
EconomicsA real, accelerating capital commitment made in the same year margins compressed fastest.
Cabotage law restricts inter-island cargo to Indonesian-flagged vessels: TMAS's core structural advantage.
EconomicsRevenue stability (flat ~Rp4.3tn) reflects this protection; margin compression reflects cost/pricing pressure within it.
EBIT margin fell from 31.8% to 14.9% over 3 years on flat revenue: costs rose or pricing softened, not volume.
EconomicsThe central unresolved question behind 4 straight years of profit decline.
Cost structureDepreciation ($317.9bn Rp FY2025 in the raw data: a large, fixed fleet-ownership cost) and interest expense (Rp87.3bn FY2025, rising with the FY2025 debt jump) are the major cost lines below EBIT; bunker fuel embedded in COGS is the dominant variable cost.
Cash cycleFreight collected on delivery, redeployed into fleet capex (accelerating sharply in FY2025) and debt service (also rising). Operating cash flow (Rp829.2bn FY2025) comfortably covers capex on a standalone basis, though capex (Rp1.40tn FY2025) exceeded operating cash flow that year, requiring external financing.
Shipbuilders/charter owners and bunker fuel suppliers set major input costs; fuel is globally priced and a real, uncontrollable variable.
Implication → Fuel-cost pressure is layered on top of the already-compressing freight-margin environment.
Domestic shippers have fewer alternatives than international routes (cabotage limits carrier choice to Indonesian-flagged vessels), giving TMAS somewhat more pricing durability than SMDR's international business, but revenue has stayed flat regardless, suggesting real demand-side softness or rate discipline pressure even within the protected lane.
Implication → Cabotage protection has not prevented margin compression: the pressure is coming from cost inflation and/or rate softening within the protected market itself.
Cabotage law is a real, structural barrier: only Indonesian-flagged vessel operators can compete on domestic inter-island routes, a genuine regulatory moat.
Implication → Entry threat is genuinely low, which makes the sustained margin decline more notable: it is not being driven by new competition.
No practical substitute for sea freight on Indonesia's inter-island archipelago routes.
Implication → Demand security is real; the margin story is entirely about cost/pricing, not volume displacement.
Competes primarily with SMDR and Pelni on domestic inter-island routes: a smaller, more concentrated competitive set than SMDR's international exposure, protected by cabotage from foreign-carrier competition.
Implication → The margin decline is happening despite a relatively protected competitive position: worth watching whether it reflects rational domestic competition or broader cost inflation.
Real, and the decline is genuinely sustained rather than a one-off reversion: net income fell for 4 consecutive years (2022-2025) on essentially flat revenue, pointing to a persistent cost or pricing issue rather than a single bad year. No one-off items identified in the reviewed data.
Checked: no material one-offs found in the reviewed window.
Cash conversionFY2025 operating cash flow (Rp829.2bn) exceeded net income (Rp499.2bn), a reasonable cash-conversion signal, but capex (Rp1.40tn) exceeded operating cash flow the same year, meaning the FY2025 investment push was partly externally financed.
A builder, and an accelerating one: FY2025 alone saw the largest single-year asset (+20.0%) and debt (+43.5%) expansion of the window, deployed in the same year profit fell fastest; a real, deliberate bet that capacity investment now will reverse the margin trend, made under real financial pressure.
DeploymentFY2025 capex (Rp1.40tn) exceeded operating cash flow (Rp829.2bn), requiring debt financing (+43.5% YoY): capital was deployed aggressively into fleet expansion despite the same year's profit decline being the steepest of the post-peak period.
Returns trendReturns have declined for 4 consecutive years (net margin 28.0%→11.5%, 2022-2025) even as the capital base grew: the clearest test case in this dataset for whether continued capex through a margin downturn eventually reverses it or simply compounds risk.
Net income fell every year since the 2022 peak (Rp1.36tn→Rp499.2bn, -63% cumulative over 4 years) while revenue stayed essentially flat: a real, quantified, sustained cost or pricing problem, not a single bad year or a volume-driven decline.
The largest single-year capex and debt expansion of the FY2021-2025 window (+20.0%/+43.5%) landed in the exact same year as the sharpest profit decline (-25.9%); a real, quantified coincidence worth monitoring: either the investment is a response to the pressure (and may relieve it going forward) or it compounds the risk if margins keep falling.
Curated narrative (educational interpretation), backed by the linked sources. The figures above are deterministic. Not investment advice.
Indonesia's logistics sector is a fragmented IDR 900 T+ market. The listed segment is narrow: ASSA dominates vehicle fleet management and used-car logistics, while unlisted JNE, J&T, and Sicepat dominate express parcel delivery. E-commerce is the sector's primary growth engine.